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Abstract  
 
While robots and automata have traditionally belonged to the realm of fiction, 
they are rapidly becoming an issue for the disarmament community. On the one 
hand, some experts believe that robots programmed to adhere to international 
humanitarian law (IHL) will be able to act more ethically than human beings 
on the battlefield. On the other hand, several commentators have disputed this 
claim, contending that the use of robots – or autonomous weapon systems 
(AWSs) – will lower the threshold to use violent force, and that such machines 
will be unable to discriminate between soldiers and civilians. Accordingly, this 
(essentially utilitarian) discussion of the consequences the deployment of 
AWSs is likely to have, remains locked in a word-against-word argument. 
Rather than focusing on the direct humanitarian effects of AWSs, people 
calling for a pre-emptive ban should point to the issue of moral agency, and the 
relationship between AWSs and human beings. Machine Autonomy and the 
Uncanny is an attempt at separating the question of ‘harm’ from questions 
pertaining to ‘the harmer’. The use of AWSs poses grave problems for the 
doctrine of the moral equality of soldiers, for the dignity of all parties involved, 
and for both legal and moral responsibility. 
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Preface  
A Note on Terminology 
‘A rose by any other name would smell as sweet’, Juliet argues in William 
Shakespeare’s play.1 Nonetheless, we need to pick a name for the objects 
discussed in this thesis. In the emerging literature on the subject, they are 
known by many: ‘Military robot’, ‘killer robot’, ‘autonomous weapon system’, 
‘lethal autonomous weapon’, and their derivatives are all used to denominate 
the same objects, yet clearly hold different connotations. In my opinion, there 
are problems with all of these labels. 
First, ‘killer robot’ seems to me best reserved for campaigners. A more 
objective term is to be preferred here. Second, ‘robot’ or ‘military robot’ I take 
to include a broader class of objects than the ones primarily under scrutiny in 
this thesis. Discarding the qualifying adjectives ‘killer’ and ‘military’ leaves us 
the terms in one way or the other including the word ‘autonomous’. The term 
‘autonomous weapon system’ is commonly used in the literature on which this 
thesis draws, but the phrase itself is seldom problematized.2 In most moral 
philosophy, particularly following Immanuel Kant, autonomy would imply a 
form of free will, and moral and legal responsibility to go with it.3 Yet, the 
prospects of robots at The Hague has not been seriously discussed by any of 
the authors using the term.  
The Kantian definition of autonomy would advise that the term 
‘autonomous weapon’ be left at the roadside.4 However, it appears that the 
term is here to stay. Thus, I shall (reluctantly) employ it throughout this thesis. 
I do not, however, as some do, differentiate between semi-autonomous 
weapons and fully autonomous weapons. It seems to me that employing such 
                                            
1 W. Shakespeare, 2000, p. 94 (II.II). 
2 T. Hellström (2013, p. 101) and W. Wallach and C. Allen (2012, 2013, pp. 133–34) are notable 
exceptions.  
3 I. Kant, 2008, p. 57; L.A. Mulholland, 1990, p. 108–9. 
4 S.M. Shell, 2009, p. 2–3. 
 x 
terms either renders the concept of ‘automation’ unnecessary, or becomes a 
tautology or pleonasm. The mixing of terms has contributed to the considerable 
confusion permeating the field.5 
 In this thesis, I take ‘autonomy’ to mean the capacity of a machine to 
act in a real-world environment independently of human control, including the 
capacity to make choices. ‘Automated’ or ‘automatic’ on the other hand, I take 
to mean the capacity to function according to pre-programmed mechanisms 
with reduced human interference. In this sense, a microwave oven that stops 
after a certain amount of time is automated, but not autonomous. While 
automation comes in degrees, autonomy is a quality. 
Unless otherwise stated, I use ‘autonomous weapon system’ (AWS) and 
‘autonomous military robot’ somewhat interchangeably. The meaning should 
be clear from the context. Neither do I enforce a sharp distinction between the 
terms ‘ethics’, ‘morality’, or any of their derivatives. 
Acknowledgements 
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5 See ICRC, 2013. 
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Dulce bellum inexpertis6 
1 Introduction 
‘The robot soldier is coming’,7 The New York Times reported in 2005. For the 
first time ever, the darlings of science fiction appeared actual prospects for the 
conceivable future: 
‘They don’t get hungry’, said Gordon Johnson of the Joint Forces 
Command at the Pentagon. ‘They’re not afraid. They don’t forget their 
orders. They don’t care if the guy next to them has just been shot. Will 
they do a better job than humans? Yes’.8 
The last few decades have seen an explosion in use, research, and development 
of increasingly automated weapon systems. The development is driven both by 
government agencies, such as the American Office of Naval Research (ONR) 
and Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), and by private 
companies across the world, like the South Korean Samsung, the American 
Northrop Grumman, and the British QinetiQ.  
Remote-controlled armed drones being well underway on their third 
decade in use,9 the advent of autonomous weapon systems appears to be 
drawing near.10 Such systems – not yet in existence – would be capable of 
identifying, selecting, and engaging targets without direct human interference. 
It is with such weapon systems that this thesis is concerned.  
Information and communication technologies have become crucial 
components in coordinating military operations. However, using such 
technologies exposes a modern army to cyber-attacks and other attempts at 
inhibiting information-flows, communication, and control. In this context, 
                                            
6 Latin proverb: ‘War is a treat for those who have not tried it.’ See Erasmus, 1982, pp. 399–400 
(Adages IV i 1). 
7 T. Weiner, 2005. 
8 T. Weiner, 2005. 
9 The first use of armed drones is believed to have been carried out by Iran against Iraqi ground forces 
in the late 1980s. F. Haghshenass, 2008, p. 17. The United States military has researched drones since 
1917. J. Gertler, 2012, p. 1. 
10 R.C. Arkin, 2008. 
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autonomous weapons have a crucial role, being envisioned as less susceptible 
to hacking, blocking, and spoofing:11 
More sophisticated […] opponents could adopt counter strategies that 
would render drones useless by jamming communication signals. But a 
fully autonomous drone could seek out its target without having to 
communicate with an operator. The use of autonomous drones is also 
likely to reduce military costs and the number of personnel required, and 
to improve operation by stripping out human error and responsetime 
limitations.12 
Autonomous systems would moreover be better suited for air battle. Due to the 
delay associated with processing information through satellites and control 
centres, current drones have a time lag, or ‘latency’, between the operator 
pulling the trigger, and the drone firing its missile. AWSs, on the other hand, 
would not suffer from this weakness.13 
A new US Military Concept called ‘Air–Sea Battle’ is seemingly a plan 
for a large-scale international armed conflict against a high-tech sate, probably 
in and around the Pacific and China Seas.14 In such a hypothetical conflict, 
autonomous weaponry could be of vital importance. As the most recent US 
roadmap for unmanned military technologies acknowledges, a potential 
conflict in the Asia–Pacific Theatre presents new challenges, potentially 
requiring unmanned systems to operate in ‘anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) 
areas where freedom to operate is contested’.15 Funding for unmanned systems 
by the US Department of Defense was increased from 284 million USD in 
2000 to 4.2 billion USD ten years later.16 
AWSs have quickly become an issue in international forums, such as the 
United Nations Human Rights Council,17 the United Nations General 
                                            
11 Allegedly, a US drone was hacked and brought to the ground by the Iranian army in 2011. See J. 
Mick, 2011. 
12 N. Sharkey, 2013. 
13 K. Abney, 2013, p. 343. 
14 Air–Sea Battle Office, 2013, p. 4. See T. Cobb, 2011. 
15 US Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, 2013, p. v. 
16 US Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, 2013, p. 3. 
17 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013. 
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Assembly First Committee,18 the European Parliament,19 and, perhaps most 
notably, in the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
(CCW).20 The CCW expert discussions were attended by a large number of 
states parties, including the all the permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council.21  
With a vote of 534 to 49 on 25 February 2014,22 the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution calling on the EU’s member states, the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the European 
Council to ‘ban the development, production and use of fully autonomous 
weapons’.23 Given the relative weakness of the EU Parliament compared to 
other organs, the Resolution was passed without much attention. Nevertheless, 
the Resolution testifies to the gained traction of AWSs on the international 
agenda. An international campaign against AWSs, dubbed ‘Stop Killer 
Robots’, was launched by a large group of NGOs in 2012.24 They claim that 
the use of AWSs is unethical, and should be prohibited.25 
Countering the critics of AWSs, the Georgia Tech roboticist Ronald C. 
Arkin has argued that properly programmed robots could in fact be better than 
human beings at adhering to the laws of war. Robots, he explains, do not feel 
pain, anger or lust of revenge, possibly the most common causes of war crimes. 
Moreover, removing human beings from the battlefield (at least on one side of 
the equation), would, ceteris paribus, lead to a net reduction of physical and 
mental trauma, he argues.26 
The US Department of Defence issued a directive in 2012, determining 
that all US strikes should be controlled and confirmed by human operators. 
While the Directive appeased some critics, the promise is due to expire in 
                                            
18 United Nations General Assembly First Committee official website, 2013. 
19 European Parliament Resolution on the Use of Armed Drones, 2014. 
20 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2013. 
21 M. Brehm, 2014, p. 2. 
22 R. Goodman, 2014. 
23 European Parliament Resolution on the Use of Armed Drones, 2014, Paragraph 2(d). 
24 See S. Goose, 2013. 
25 S. Goose, 2013. 
26 R.C. Arkin, 2008, pp. 6–8. See also M. Sassòli, 2013. 
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2022.27 Furthermore, the promise to stay ‘in the loop’ appears contradictory to 
the conclusions of the Roadmap for Unmanned Weapon Systems28 and (if more 
implicitly) the Air–Sea Battle Concept,29 both of which stress that autonomy 
may be militarily necessary.  
Most successful campaigns to ban specific weapons, like the campaigns 
against anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, were able to build their 
cases on the basis of grave and well-documented violations of the rule of 
discrimination between soldiers and civilians.30 However, it is unclear whether 
such arguments can be made for AWSs. As they are not yet in existence, the 
actual consequences of their use are difficult to assess. It has been argued that 
the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots lacks a central argument: What is actually 
at stake? What is the case against ‘killer robots’?31 According to one 
commentator, the case presented by Human Rights Watch (HRW), founding 
and senior member of the campaign Stop Killer Robots, is dystopian and 
irrational: 
By reducing the discussion to a simplified fear campaign aimed at 
stopping the development of autonomous systems, HRW may very well 
be preventing the deployment of systems that can be more careful and 
less likely to harm civilians. Such an approach means their fear 
campaign may end up harming the innocent people they intend to 
protect.32 
In this thesis, I investigate and expand on the case against AWSs. 
Thematically, the topic of this thesis touches upon the disciplines of ethics, 
law, and political science. Accordingly, my methodological approach is 
eclectic (see Chapter 2). All of the sub-questions addressed in this thesis could 
arguably be dealt with more thoroughly. In this thesis, however, the idea is to 
                                            
27 US Department of Defense, 2012, p. 4. 
28 US Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, 2013, p. v. 
29 Air–Sea Battle Office, 2013, p. 2. 
30 It has been argued that the apparent lack of clear military utility of the weapons in question was also 
important. E.g. ICRC, 1994, p. 73; O. Dullum, 2007, p. 143. A notable exception to the notion that 
banning a weapon requires well-documented violations of IHL and HRL is blinding lasers, which were 
banned pre-emptively through the CCW Protocol IV. 
31 E.g. G. McNeal, 2013; S. Hughes, 2013. 
32 G. McNeal, 2013. 
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present a policy-oriented birds-eye perspective, while still offering new 
approaches to the development and use of AWSs. 
1.1 Research Question: How Might a Prohibition of AWSs Be 
Justified? 
The heading above captures the central research question of this thesis: How 
might a prohibition of autonomous weapon systems (AWSs) be justified? 
Answering this question will require an identification and assessment of 
normative arguments applicable under existing international law. Until now, all 
conventions banning particular weapons have been justified with the weapons’ 
breach with the norms of distinction or of avoiding unnecessary suffering and 
superfluous injury.33 If current international law and its history is anything to 
go by, this thesis could be limited to addressing those two norms. However, 
AWSs raise concerns that until recently were inconceivable. What a legal ban 
really comes down to is political will. Thus, I believe it both important and 
necessary to look at arguments beyond the traditional requirements of 
distinction and avoidance of unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury. I 
shall argue that while international law is an essential component in our 
evaluation of these weapon systems, existing law fails to address the core 
challenge posed by AWSs. 
In order to answer the overarching research question, four main 
questions have to be addressed along the way:  
  
                                            
33  To the former category belong weapon (systems) such as anti-personnel mines, and cluster 
munitions. To the latter category belong weapon (systems) such as incendiary weapons, blinding lasers 
(the only weapon to be banned pre-emptively, i.e. before it was ever in use), and non-detectable 
fragments. Some weapons could be argued to be banned on both grounds, for example chemical and 
bacteriological weapons. 
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Part I: ‘Harm’ 
(1) A slippery slope?: Do unintended, negative consequences of the use of 
AWSs justify their prohibition?  
(2) The conduct of hostilities: Can the use of AWSs be squared with the 
rules of distinction, proportionality, avoidance of unnecessary 
suffering, and precautions in attack? 
Part II: ‘The Harmer’ 
(1) Accountability: Who is responsible for potential international crimes 
committed by an AWS? 
(2) Agency: Is it morally permissible to delegate kill-decisions to machines 
regardless of the humanitarian consequences of their use?   
As is evident from the classification above, I propose to divide the thesis in 
two, based on the perspective taken. In the fist part, I address the humanitarian 
consequences of the use of AWSs. In the second part, I leave consequences 
aside, discussing the responsibility and agency of autonomous systems. 
1.2 Definition and Background 
There is no universally agreed upon definition of AWSs. The discussion in this 
thesis is based on the ICRC’s working definition, which, although terse, seems 
to capture the central element that states and academics discuss when referring 
to AWSs. They define AWSs as: 
Weapons that can independently select and attack targets.34 
The word ‘select’ is a key word of the definition, as it implies the capability to 
make intelligent decisions. A ‘target’ should be understood as an enemy soldier 
or military object the sense of international humanitarian law (IHL); ‘civilian 
target’ is a tautology.35 Selecting a target necessitates sophisticated information 
processing and judgement. In the language of computer science and robotics, 
an autonomous agent requires significant ‘artificial intelligence’ or 
                                            
34 ICRC, 2014b, p. 1. The ICRC’s definition is very similar to those of Human Rights Watch (2012, p. 
2), Pax for Peace (2014, p. 4), and the US Department of Defense (US DoD Directive, 2012, p. 14). 
35 API, Article 51. See S. Casey-Malen, 2014 (forthcoming). 
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‘autonomous power’.36 Hence, the definition excludes for example anti-
personnel landmines. Crucially, an AWS is capable of selecting targets 
‘independently’, i.e. without human intervention. I shall not discuss the use of 
military robots only intended for such tasks as transportation, mine detection, 
or bomb disposal. Although some of the inferences made in this thesis may 
apply to any autonomous system, I am primarily concerned with weapons 
capable of harming human beings. I am less concerned with weapons only 
intended to engage inanimate objects, for example missile defence systems.37 
Noel Sharkey provides a classification of three types of automated 
systems, the latter of which may be considered autonomous according to the 
definition above: (1) scripted, like intercontinental ballistic missiles, (2) 
supervised, like RQ-1 Predator drones, and (3) intelligent, ‘which uses 
attributes of human intelligence in software to make decisions, perceive and 
interpret the meaning of sensed information, diagnose problems, and 
collaborate with other systems’.38 
In the literature on AWSs, reference is commonly made to the concepts 
of having humans ‘in the loop’, ‘on the loop’, or ‘out of the loop’.39 While ‘in 
the loop’ implies that the weapon system is remote-controlled by a human, ‘on 
the loop’ means that a human does not directly control the weapon system, but 
surveys its actions, and can assume direct control at any time. Lastly, ‘out of 
the loop’ Is taken to mean an arrangement whereby the weapon system acts 
autonomously, without any human interference. In the terminology of this 
thesis, AWS is synonymous with the latter. 
It is generally agreed that AWSs do not yet exist, but there are clear 
precursors.40 According to most definitions, AWSs are able to ‘attack targets’. 
While no technology is failsafe, the ability to attack a ‘target’ implies at a 
minimum that the weapon is capable of distinguishing between combatants and 
                                            
36 T. Hellström, 2013, p. 101. 
37 E.g. the US Navy’s Phalanx CIWS. 
38 N. Sharkey, 2008, p. 16. 
39 E.g. Sharkey, 2010, p. 369; Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 2; M.N. Schmitt and J.S. Thurnher, 2013. 
40 See C. Heyns, 2013, p. 5; Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 3.  
 8 
non-combatants on a rudimentary level: No non-combatant may be described 
as a ‘target’. For example, Samsung’s SGR-A1 and DoDAAM’s Super aEgis 2, 
both stationary sentry gun systems stationed at the Korean ‘demilitarized’ zone, 
are able to identify and lock onto targets without human operators.  
Raytheon’s stationary Phalanx CIWS (close-in weapon system)41 is 
according to its manufacturer capable of carrying out ‘functions usually 
performed by multiple systems – including search, detection, threat evaluation, 
tracking, engagement, and kill assessment’.42  
A new generation drone, Northrop Grumman’s X-47B, is currently 
undergoing flight tests, and is expected to be operational in 2015. In the fall of 
2013, it became the first vehicle to successfully complete a flight entirely by 
algorithm (without human controllers), including landing and take-off.43 
Whether the system also has the capacity to select and engage targets 
autonomously, has not been disclosed.44 
Yet, neither the SGR-A1, Phalanx CIWS, X-47B, or any other weapon 
system have – according to most accounts45 – been used to full effect with 
humans ‘out of the loop’. They are furthermore utterly incapable of 
distinguishing between military targets and civilians, thus falling short of the 
definition.46 On the other hand, there is obviously a large grey area. For 
example, with some automated systems, the time allotted for human 
deliberation ‘in the loop’ – the decision whether to allow the system to fire – is 
sometimes, as with most robotic anti-missile defence systems, a matter of a few 
seconds, and is thus not very meaningful.47 Moreover, with ‘signature’ drone 
strikes, targeting is based on predetermined criteria, and the role of human 
                                            
41 The Phalanx system was developed by General Dynamics Corporation which was later bought by 
Raytheon. It ‘is installed on all US Navy surface combatant ship classes and on those of 24 allied 
nations’. See Raytheon’s official website, 2014. 
42 Raytheon’s official website, 2014. 
43 Naval Air Systems Command, 2013. 
44 D. Gayle, 2012. 
45 See M.N. Schmitt and J.S. Thurnher, 2013, p. 239. 
46 See M.N. Schmitt and J.S. Thurnher, 2013, p. 239. 
47 P.W. Singer, 2010, pp. 124–5. 
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intelligence and decision-making is severely limited.48 Evidently, we see that 
while the distinction between autonomous and automated weapons is 
unproblematic in theory, in practice it becomes blurred. Nevertheless, 
discussing AWSs – the ‘ideal type’ of a machine having control of targeting-
decisions – is important in order to identify the principles and ideals against 
which we would like to hold both existing and emerging technologies.  
Both the academic and the public discourses have been hampered by 
imprecise use of terms and concepts, and by a failure to be explicit about the 
types of weapons and platforms actually under scrutiny. While there are 
common issues to both unmanned, automated, autonomous, or even the broader 
range of emerging military technologies as a whole, autonomous weapons beg 
a host of additional, distinct questions of their own, particularly regarding 
target selection.49 
Over the last decade, military robots have received heightened interest. 
The obvious reason for this is the simple fact that due to amazing advances in 
electronics and engineering, science fiction is no longer as fictitious as it used 
to be. ‘Revolutions in military affairs’ (RMAs) are well documented through 
history, signifying the introduction of ideas or equipment into the field of war 
with consequences so profound that ‘the rules of the game’ have to be re-
written. Has the development in software engineering and robotics now 
produced a robotic RMA?50  
So-called riskless warfare is not new. Catapults and artillery are old 
inventions that, at least under asymmetric conditions, have allowed the risk-
free inflection of harm.  However, AWSs differ from former long-distance 
weapons in important ways: While some robotic systems are intended to 
complement human soldiers, others are intended as their replacements. Such a 
role is qualitatively different from that of former ‘riskless’ weapons, which 
                                            
48 Stanford and NYU, 2012, p. 12. 
49 For example, the issue of sovereignty and non-intervention is commonly raised in the context of 
armed drones. Since this issue does not appear to have direct relevance to autonomous targeting, it falls 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
50 E.g. P. Rose, 2012, p. 366. 
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more strictly are tools in the hands of humans. In the case of these older 
weapons, there is a clearer causal link between humans and the firing of the 
weapon. In the case of AWSs, the system itself both selects and attacks its 
target, evidently breaking the direct causal link between human and weapon.  
  
 11 
2 A Poverty of Normative Methods? 
This thesis belongs in part to the field of ethics and in part to the field of 
jurisprudence or legal philosophy, both of which may be said to belong to the 
broader field of normative political philosophy. Analysing the case against 
AWSs call for the use of normative and legal research methods. Any study is 
arguably conducted by means of some method, but are there distinctive 
methods for normative theory? In Politics and Vision, Princeton professor 
Sheldon Wolin writes that political philosophy distinguishes itself from other 
branches of academia mainly through its subject matter. The philosophical 
method and its goal is the same for all its schools and branches: ‘truths publicly 
arrived at and publicly demonstrable’.51 In practice, this implies logical 
reasoning and convincing arguments. At the same time, this is admittedly the 
foundation of every scholarly discipline there is. In an influential article, Wolin 
went on to identify a conflict between ‘methodists’ and ‘theoreticians’. He 
asserted that there is an opposition between method and theory, and that 
students of politics have to pick one of the two52 I would argue that there is no 
such built-in opposition between the theory and method. A method is simply 
the way in which one generates, corroborates, or tries to falsify theory, or, more 
plainly, the way in which one practically goes about answering questions. In 
this section, I first discuss the philosophical methods of the dialectic, 
interpretation, and non-ideal assumptions, before I briefly present the legal 
positivist method, which informs the legal parts of this thesis. 
2.1 Dialectic 
First, I regard the principle of contradiction advocated by such thinkers as 
Socrates and Hegel as a favourable way of approaching the ideal of objectivity. 
A schematic approach of ‘thesis–antithesis–synthesis’, however, is not helpful, 
                                            
51 S.S. Wolin 2004, p. 4.  
52 S.S. Wolin, 1969, p. 1062.  
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and was advocated neither by Plato’s Socrates nor Hegel.53 Hegelian dialectics 
is wedded to the thought that the contradiction of a concept is a fruitful way of 
broadening the analyst’s mental space (and somewhat more controversially 
how the external world is structured).54 In the terminology of political science 
we might say that the dialectical method is a philosophical way of ensuring the 
largest possible variation on the variables in order to avoid bias.55  
According to Christopher Meckstroth, the whole concept of a ‘method’, 
and indeed the Greek word methodos, first appears in Plato’s writings. He sums 
up Socrates’ principles as ‘(1) anti-foundational, (2) non-algorithmic, (3) 
indirect and relative to competing hypotheses, and (4) developing its own 
standards of objectivity through the logic of asking questions’.56 Plato calls the 
method elenchus, which could be translated as meaning ‘cross-examination’ or 
‘refutation’. The posing of questions force us to think twice about the 
coherence of our beliefs, and how principles relate to each other.  
Socrates arguably does not start from some first principle or theory of 
‘the good’, he simply forces his ever-confident dialogue partners to think about 
how their principles relate to each other, and to the empirical world. The 
method is thus based on negatively identifying internal inconsistencies, often 
labelled immanent critique. This technique distinguishes itself from both 
deduction and induction as it does not presuppose any positive foundational 
premise, be it logic or statistical inference.  
The idea that sound ethical injunctions can be elicited through a 
dialogue between people taking opposite positions can be extended to the 
relationship between an analyst and his or her textual sources. 57 This is how the 
dialectical method is most often employed in practice, and is how I shall 
practice it in this thesis. Ethical propositions and statements made in books and 
                                            
53 E.g. G.E. Mueller, 1958. 
54 C. Taylor, 2005, p. 226; G.W.F. Hegel, 1963I, pp. 30–1. 
55 Bias resulting from truncated variables arises when cases are selected on the dependent variable; that 
is, when only cases with either high or low scores on the dependent variable are included in the 
analysis. A truncated independent variable on the other hand does not cause bias, but ‘only’ 
imprecision (increased standard errors). See B. Geddes, 1990. 
56 C. Meckstroth, 2012, pp. 644–5. 
57 H.G. Gadamer, 1999, pp. 362, 365, 368. 
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articles can be tested and interpreted by demonstrating their coherence and 
relationship to broader principles or codes. However, any one ‘truth’ can never 
be obtained using the dialectical method; what one is left with are reasons for 
preferring one explanation or statement to others. As such, the output of the 
dialectical method is ‘true’ or ‘false’ only relative to competing positions.  
Just as empirical science, normative scholarship is grounded in 
empirical facts and theoretical directives. Normative theorists make claims 
about how the world should be ordered and why, starting in Ancient Greece 
with how the just city should be ordered.58 Thus, they are just as bound to 
aspire to valid and reliable knowledge about how the world works as analysts 
with more strictly empirical pretentions. As David Hume so famously argued, 
‘is’ does not imply ‘ought’, but ‘ought’ to a certain extent implies ‘can’.59 The 
‘ought’-part of normative theory, however, (indeed its defining part) will be 
chiefly theoretical (although the theory builds on empirical facts). How to 
arrive at the ‘ought’ will, methodically, to a large degree be determined by the 
theory to which the author subscribes.60 Hence, in ethics, the overlap between 
theory and method is perhaps greater than in more strictly empirically oriented 
disciplines.61 
An epistemological distinction manifest in modern political philosophy 
is also worth mentioning: Theorists such as John Rawls, Michael Walzer, and 
Axel Honneth aim to approximate objectivity by coming up with justifications 
for arguments through analytic or dialectical arguments. The members of 
another group, to which Judith Butler, Richard Ashley and others may be said 
to belong, hold that analytical arguments conceal important questions about 
politics and power, rather preferring deconstructive, post-structural, and other 
methods agonistic to objectivity.62 I take the position of the former – that it is 
indeed both possible and desirable to make sense of the world with the 
                                            
58 Plato, 1989, see especially books IV and V. 
59 See G.E.M. Anscombe, 2007, pp. 30–1.  
60 See N.L. Sturgeon, 2011, pp. 517–9.  
61 See D. Leopold, 2010, p. 126. 
62 C. Meckstroth, 2012, p. 644. 
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language available to us in an attempt at approximating objectivity. This is not 
to say that we should not be critical of the terms we use.  
2.2 Interpretation 
In his Interpretation and Social Criticism, Michael Walzer differentiates 
between three ways of doing moral philosophy: discovery, invention, and 
interpretation. The path of discovery is often employed by theorists of natural 
law and by many religious thinkers. Here, ethical propositions are thought to be 
revealed or discovered. They are in other words, created not by men or women, 
but by the Divine or by inspiration.63 Using the path of invention, the analyst or 
inventor sets out to detach herself as much as possible, entering the position of 
the eagle (or, by analogy, the position of the Divine). For the output of such a 
method to represent more than the subjective injunctions of an individual, the 
inventor must assume an impartial position. The problem of how one might 
achieve this in practice was most elegantly solved by John Rawls with his 
original position, the ‘veil of ignorance’,64 Walzer asserts.65  
The third and final path, to which both Walzer himself and this author 
subscribe, is the path of interpretation. ‘The claim of interpretation is simply 
this’, Walzer asserts, ‘that neither discovery nor invention is necessary because 
we already possess what they pretend to provide. Morality, unlike politics, does 
not require executive authority or systematic legislation’. Indeed, ‘the moral 
world has a lived-in quality’.66 Normative theory should start from the values 
manifest in society, rather than formal, abstract principles.67 I take the same 
methodological approach, assuming that the application of abstract principles 
to society that the inventor or discoverer must make, often complicates 
questions of methodology and viability more than it brings in clarity and 
                                            
63 M. Walzer, 1987, p. 4. 
64 See J. Rawls 1999. 
65 M. Walzer, 1987, pp. 4, 11. 
66 M. Walzer, 1987, pp. 19–20. 
67 A. Honneth, 2011, p.119. 
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objectivity. Yet, as with the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory 
discussed in the next section, the distinction between the three paths is by no 
means watertight. 
The distinction between the path of interpretation and the paths of 
discovery and invention to a certain extent mirrors a corresponding debate of 
about two hundred years ago. In his 1821 Philosophy of Right, G.W.F. Hegel 
accuses Immanuel Kant of ‘empty formalism’, pointing to the practical 
infeasibility of the abstract categorical imperative. The imperative – ‘act only 
according to that maxim, whereby you could at the same time want that maxim 
to become a universal law’68 – is only as good as the person contemplating it, 
Hegel argues.69 While recognizing that the radical autonomy of the categorical 
imperative could serve analytical purposes, Hegel held the actual norms of a 
society, its ‘ethical idea’ (Sittlichkeit), to be the pinnacle of social legitimacy, 
authority and obligation.70  
There is at least one important objection to Walzer’s and Hegel’s stress 
on the here-and-now as the ultimate appeal of ethics: It might neglect a 
significant critical aspect of ethical inquiry.71 Looking back at history, it is 
obvious that the moral fibre of any society evolves; we are fervently opposed to 
many practices formerly endorsed or unquestioned. Obvious historical 
examples include slavery and suppression of women and many minorities. One 
of the founders of critical theory, Max Horkheimer, warns against a theory that 
‘settles down with some truth’72, and advises the analyst to reflect critically on 
the relationship between the subjective and the objective, between the analyst 
and her objects, and between concrete historical processes and the future.73 
Indeed, the prospect of moral relativism lurks in the background of any 
communitarian or interpretative theory. In response to this, I would second the 
                                            
68 My translation of ‘Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, daβ sie 
ein allgemeines Gesetz werde’, I. Kant, 2008, p. 57. 
69 G.W.F. Hegel, 1902, §§ 140-1. 
70 G.W.F. Hegel, 1902, §§, 70, 257. 
71 A. Honneth, 2003, p. 137. 
72 My translation of ‘Die Philosophie, die bei sich selbst, bei irgendeiner Warheit, Ruhe finden meint’. 
M. Horkheimer, 1970, p. 64. 
73 M. Horkheimer, 1970, p. 24. 
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theorists adhering to the so-called theory of recognition in their claim that – 
albeit with constant setbacks and inconsistencies – the moral evolution of 
societies by way of intersubjective recognition is a positive one. It should, then, 
be possible to unveil immoral practices or inconsistent positions if one is able 
to anticipate the direction of this evolution.74 
2.3 Non-Ideal Assumptions 
An important distinction that has received increasing attention in the literature 
on the methodology of political theory is between so called ideal and non-ideal 
theory. The distinction was first made by John Rawls,75 and concerns the 
rudimentary assumptions the analyst makes when investigating an issue. 
Whereas ideal theory deals with the ancient question of how to build a just city 
from a tabula rasa, non-ideal theory is concerned with how to approximate 
justice in practice.76 According to critics, proponents of ideal theory do not 
merely abstract away complicating factors, but add unrealistic assumptions, 
thus being guilty of ‘idealization’.77 Non-ideal theory, on the other hand, 
proceeds from the assumption that the real world tends to require pragmatic 
solutions.78 
 The proponents of ideal theory are not defenceless against this criticism. 
In order to imagine the perfect system, or justice in its ideal form, we might 
have to assume what Michael Walzer labels ‘the position of the eagle’, looking 
down at the here-and-now from a privileged position.79 If several analysts make 
the same assumptions, moreover, it is possible to build cumulative scholarship 
also in normative disciplines.80 According to Zofia Stemplowska, the 
relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory is not dichotomous. Rather, it 
                                            
74 A. Honneth, 1995, 2003; C. Taylor, 1994. See Chapter 6 for more on the theory of recognition, and 
its application to autonomous weapon systems. 
75 J. Rawls, 1999, pp. 215-6. 
76 A. Swift and S. White, 2010, p. 58. 
77 C. Farrelly, 2007, pp. 844–5. 
78 C. Farrelly, 2007, pp. 844. 
79 M. Walzer, 1987, pp. 4, 11. 
80 See Z. Stemplowska, 2008, pp. 327–8. 
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is a continuum between making a large amount of fanciful abstractions and 
making none at all. All points along this continuum may have their strengths 
and weaknesses, and most analysts, for instance Rawls, make use of both ideal 
and non-ideal theory for different sections of their work.81 
 Taking on questions about the use of autonomous weapon systems in 
international armed conflict, I have to consider the broader system in which 
these questions are to be placed. This broader system, or context, is 
international relations. According one of the most dominant theoretical 
conceptions of this system, the school of realism, the international system of 
states comprises an anarchy. The lack of a world government causes the states 
to fear each other’s intentions, producing the behavioural outcome of self-help 
and a desire to maximize one’s power.82 Since there is no world government, 
states are left to their own best efforts.83 Although this Realist analysis has the 
air of a pointed formulation, there appears to be at least some truth to it. This 
has led many to question the vigour of international law and cooperation in 
international affairs. States are unlikely to bind themselves or stay bound if the 
mechanism in question is not conducive to their national interests (in which 
humanitarian concerns feature only to varying degrees). 
In this context, it seems obvious that the international system is not 
ideal. Using ideal theory to analyse robotic warfare, then, a sub-issue within 
international relations, would be an academic exercise bordering irrelevance, if 
done without constructing an ideal theory for the entire international system. 
Such an exercise falls beyond the scope of this thesis. I would argue that both 
ideal and non-ideal theory have their virtues. For the purpose of this thesis, 
however, non-ideal assumptions seem to me more appropriate. Yet it must be 
stressed: I do not think that it is possible to write without – implicitly or 
explicitly – making assumptions. Assumptions are never ‘true’, they are 
                                            
81 Z. Stemplowska, 2008, p. 339. See also A. Hamlin and Z. Stemplowska, 2012, p. 60. 
82 A distinction is sometimes drawn between offensive (favouring power maimation) and defensive 
realism (favouring security maximation), but this is not important in this context. See e.g. G.H Snyder, 
2002, p. 149. 
83 J.J. Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 33–4. 
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heuristic devices to help us make sense of the complex and messy world in 
which we live. As the Hungarian philosopher of science, Imre Lakatos, puts it: 
Without assumptions and theory, scholarship becomes ‘a curiosity shop where 
funny local – or cosmic – oddities are collected and displayed’.84 
The theoretical lenses employed in this thesis are Hegelian. All but 
totally absent from the largely Anglo-American peace and conflict literature 
and the literature on weapons and disarmament, Hegel has been revived in 
social theory and philosophy. The current director of the Institut für 
Sozialforschung at the University of Frankfurt, Axel Honneth, has been pivotal 
in this rediscovery and development of the dialectical Hegelian thought in 
modern social theory. There may well be a reason for the absence of Hegelian 
thought in the recent peace and conflict literature. According to Karl Popper, 
Hegel’s thought is no more than ‘emptiness’: ‘The question arises whether 
Hegel deceived himself, hypnotized by his own inspiring jargon, or whether he 
boldly set out to deceive and bewitch others. I am satisfied that the latter was 
the case’.85 Notwithstanding this critique, I shall try to make sense of Hegelian 
thought and its application to AWSs, particularly in the last chapter on the 
question of AWSs with a ‘licence to kill’.  
Normative statements are always opined. Nonetheless, political 
philosophy has a strong methodological basis, and there are indeed normative 
methods that go beyond ‘mere’ argument and reason. In this thesis I work 
primarily from the basis of non-ideal assumptions, and I shall try to interpret 
the moral arguments put forth in the literature in a critical, dialectic fashion. 
The theoretical frameworks employed in this thesis are not presented in one 
bulk, but is drawn upon during the course of the analysis. 
                                            
84 I. Lakatos, 1984, p. 102. 
85 K. Popper, 1945, p. 26. 
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2.4 Legal Positivism 
The parts of this thesis in which the legality of AWSs under existing 
international law is discussed (chapters 4 and 5), I draw on so-called legal 
positivism, the dominant methodology when determining lex lata, or ‘the law 
as it is’. Analysts sometimes also discuss lex ferenda, or ‘how the law should 
be’. Notwithstanding the political and moral importance of discussing lex 
ferenda, courts and legal practitioners are bound by lex lata when delivering 
judgements. Thus, when determining the existing landscape of the law 
applicable to autonomous systems, I employ legal positivism. The other parts 
of this essay, in which potential grounds of banning AWSs beyond 
international law is investigated, may reasonably be labelled a study of lex 
ferenda.  
Legal positivism has its roots in the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and 
John Austin, but received its most famous formulation by H.L.A. Hart. Hart 
primarily discussed domestic law, in which the structure of enforcement is 
typically envisioned as vertical, with a ‘Leviathan’86 on top of the structure. 
International law on the other hand, should be thought of as a horizontal 
system, founded on agreements between consenting states. However, it is 
generally agreed that most of Hart’s conclusion are applicable also to 
international law despite the difference in enforcement structure.87 
According to John Gardner, legal positivism can be summarized as the 
following proposition: ‘In any legal system, whether a given norm is legally 
valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of that system, depends on its 
sources, not its merits’.88 Accordingly, I shall draw on the law itself, as custom 
and as codified in treaties and conventions, and on the comments of legal 
scholars and Courts. The Statute of the International Court of Justice defines 
the following as the sources of international law:  
                                            
86 See T. Hobbes, 2008, Chapter XIII. 
87 H.L.A. Hart, 1961, pp. 14–5, 217–20. See also S. Besson and J. Tasioulas, 2010, p. 9–11. 
88 J. Gardner, 2001, p. 199. 
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(a) international conventions […]; (b) international custom […]; the 
general principles of law […]; (d) […] judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, 
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.89  
These shall be the primary sources for my discussion on the legality of AWSs 
under existing international law. It is important to note, however, that legal 
positivism informs this study as a method of determining lex lata, not as a 
theory to judge right from wrong or determine ontological or epistemological 
questions beyond those of existing international law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
89 Statute for the International Court of Justice, Article 38. 
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3 A Slippery Slope? 
Let us assume, for the purpose of this chapter, that robots could function in the 
manner described by Ron Arkin, who is convinced that AWSs could perform 
‘more ethically than human soldiers’.90 (This question is dealt with more 
thoroughly in Chapter 4.) There are nevertheless objections to the use and 
development of AWSs. In this chapter I investigate a class of arguments 
stressing that the deployment of AWSs may lead to a host of unintended 
consequences. The aim here is not to exhaust the issue of unintended 
consequences, but to hint at a few challenges a Consequentialist ‘slippery 
slope’ approach faces. 
Breaking an existing rule, or introducing a new one, might in some 
cases lead to the watering down or disregard for other rules, or have 
unintended, negative consequences. This is commonly known as the ‘slippery 
slope’ argument. The technological introduction of AWSs does not exactly 
introduce a legal rule, or necessarily conflict with old ones (see Chapter 4), but 
as a potential RMA, it constitutes a change in ‘the rules of the game’, and 
impacts on how we think about war.  
3.1 A Lower Threshold to Use Force? 
The ‘slippery slope’ argument is commonly rehearsed against the use and 
development of AWSs. Peter Asaro, for example, claims that AWSs have the 
potential to ‘lower the threshold for nations to start wars’.91 In addition to 
impacting the initiation of war, the use of AWSs may impact the threshold to 
resort to the use of force in already on-going conflicts. While the former is a 
                                            
90 R.C. Arkin, 2008, p. 7; M. Sassòli, 2013. Being better at adhering to international humanitarian law, 
however, does not necessarily imply a net decrease in overall harm. Killing enemy soldiers is perfectly 
in line with IHL (API, Article 48), and the proportionality principle allows for unlimited civilian 
casualties as long as they can be justified in military advantage (API, Article 51).  
91 P. Asaro, 2012, p. 692.  
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question of jus ad bellum (the rules for the initiation of war), the second is a 
question of jus in bello (rules for the conduct of war).  
In this section, I draw on the just war tradition, a long line of thought 
dating back to ancient Greek philosophy.92 The just war tradition may be 
identified as one of three very broad takes on war: First, the programmatic 
Realists view is that ‘universal moral principles cannot be applied to the 
actions of state’.93 A classic exposure of realist reasoning is found in 
Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, where the conquering 
Athenians explain the Melians that ‘the strong do what they can and the weak 
suffer what they must’.94 
Second, antithetical to the realist stance, pacifists oppose war more or 
less categorically. Many pacifists have for example opposed the development 
of international humanitarian law (IHL), because it implicitly recognized the 
act of using force.95  
While pacifism and realism (somewhat simplified) are absolutes on each 
end of a spectrum, thinkers employing a third approach, the just war tradition, 
have typically claimed that wars can be legitimate granted that certain 
conditions are met, including a just cause, a right authority, and proportionality. 
According to Oxford professor Henry Shue, the attitude of IHL towards the 
grave violations of ordinary law and morality that war, killing, and wounding 
imply, ‘can be well captured by the pithy phrase “shit happens”’.96  
Augustine of Hippo is an important figure in the just war tradition. His 
attempt to bridge the messages of the New and Old Testaments resulted in the 
view that while Christians should on principle be pacifists, they were 
                                            
92 E. Begby et al., 2012, p. 316. 
93 H. Morgenthau, 2006, pp. 9–10. 
94 Thucydides, 2009, V.XVII. Emphasis added. 
95 R.P. Alford, 2008, p. 68. Strict Realist and Pacifist positions typically obligate their subscribers to 
strong non-ideal and ideal methodological positions respectively. IHL – which largely grew out of the 
just war tradition of Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, and others – lends non-ideal 
assumptions from Realism, and the moral content – humanitarianism – from Pacifism. See G. Nystuen 
and K. Egeland, 2014. 
96 H. Shue, 2010, p. 516. 
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nevertheless justified in taking up arms if they needed to protect themselves or 
their religion from unruly neighbours.  
3.1.1 The Limitations on the Use of Force ad Bellum 
Due to the harm it causes, Michael Walzer argues, war should always be a last 
resort.97 The argument is one of the central tenets of the just war tradition.98 
According to several of the most quoted authors in the field, including Armin 
Krishnan, Peter Singer, Human Rights Watch, Pax, and Peter Asaro, the use of 
AWSs may create lower barriers for war through the technological benefits 
they present.99 While none of these authors discuss the proposition in any 
detail, a lower threshold to use force, we must assume, is an ethical challenge 
because conflict inevitably leads to the infliction of harm. Two questions are of 
importance: First, is it true that AWSs lower the threshold to use force? And 
second, if the first question is answered affirmatively, does this mandate the 
prohibition of AWSs? Let us first consider the mechanisms that limit the 
freedom of state leaders to use force (i.e. heighten the threshold to start wars).  
First, international law prohibits all use of armed force unless in self-
defence or if authorized by the UN Security Council.100 State leaders pondering 
the use of armed force would have to consider legal ramifications and, as a 
future prospect, potential criminal prosecution of their acts.101 Second, state 
leaders have beliefs, values, and moral understandings, which may or may not 
restrain their will to wage war. Third, wars are financially expensive and cost 
                                            
97 M. Walzer, 2006, p. 84. 
98 See H. Syse, 2003, p. 109. 
99 A. Krishnan, 2009, p. 150; P. Singer, 2010, p.324 ; Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 39–40; M. 
Ekelhof and M. Struyk, 2014, p. 10; P. Asaro, 2012, p. 692. 
100 Charter of the United Nations, Articles 2(4), 51, and 42. The ‘last resort’ requirement is an integral 
part of the international law of jus ad bellum. The so-called responsibility to protect is still not an 
established exception from the prohibition of the use of force, as it must be authorized by a Chapter VII 
UN Security Council Resolution. See J. Nahem and K. Egeland, 2014. 
101 The Rome Statute of the ICC did not provide a definition of the crime of aggression, but after the 
review conference in Kampala, Article 8 bis (not yet in force) defines the crime of aggression as the 
‘planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its 
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations’ 
(Resolution RC/Res. 6, 11.06.2010). Thus, the crime of aggression could lead to individual criminal 
liability. 
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lives. Higher costs, both in human and financial terms, typically turn the people 
and electorates against their war-waging rulers. Fear of popular opposition and 
potential electoral defeat, then, may constrain leaders before initiating a costly 
war.102  
AWSs arguably affect the threshold of the viability of the use of force 
through coaxing the second and, more obviously, the third of these 
mechanisms. Beginning in reverse order, we may expect that the more costly a 
government expects a war to be, the more careful it will be in avoiding it.103 I 
shall in the following section first discuss the direct cost of war in terms of 
human lives and financial expenses, before briefly discussing the suggestion 
that AWSs may impact on the way in which we all, and more crucially, state 
leaders, think about war.  
AWSs are unmanned systems and thus relieve the soldiers who would 
otherwise have manned the system or weapon of risk of harm. Current drones 
and other long-distance weapons display the same dynamic, whereby the 
operator of the weapon is located in a safe distance from the battlefield. It has 
been suggested by several commentators that the US ‘targeted’ killings on 
Pakistani, Yemeni, and Somali territory, killing around 3000 people by the 
most conservative accounts,104 would not have been carried out in the absence 
of drone technology (in other words taking the use of force from ‘no resort’ to 
‘resort’).105  
While I have disputed the utility of the concept of ‘full autonomy’, it 
may make sense to call autonomous weapons ‘fully unmanned’.106 For as it 
happens, drone operators are not completely exempted from risk. The analogy 
between drone warfare and video games has often been made, but evidence 
                                            
102 Sometimes, the oposite may be true. H. Norpoth and A.H. Sidman (2007, p. 180), for example, 
argue that Britain’s War in the Falklands in 1982 and the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 
secured re-election for Margaret Thatcher and George W. Bush, respectively 
103 S. Van Evera, 1999, p. 30. 
104 Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2014. 
105 Ignatieff, 2012; J. Scahill, 2009. It is, of course, possible to make the case that the drone strikes are 
morally justified, and that they have made the world as a whole safer from ‘terrorists’. This position 
has, however, been forcefully contradicted by a number of commentators, e.g. D. Kilcullen and A.M. 
Exum, 2009. 
106 A remote-controlled drone, then, would be ‘physically unmanned’. 
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suggests that drone operators do not take as lightly on taking lives as some 
commentators have claimed.107 According to a study conducted by the 
Pentagon, drone pilots were actually slightly more likely to get a psychiatric 
diagnosis than pilots of manned fighter aircraft. (The difference between the 
two groups was, however, not statistically significant.)108 
AWSs would not suffer mental illness. They would thus free soldiers of 
both physical and mental risk, ceteris paribus decreasing the suffering 
associated with a war. On the other hand, the effect of a moderate decrease in 
mental illness among veterans on the threshold to use force ad bellum is 
probably small. Physical risk – body bags – likely have a much stronger effect. 
If so, the difference between AWSs and other unmanned systems such as 
remote-controlled drones should be negligible.  
As noted, the financial cost of war is also an important determinant of 
the viability of war. Although the current research phase of AWSs is 
expensive, the complementing and replacement of human soldiers with robots 
is expected to reduce military expenditures in the long term. In terms of direct 
cost, the commonly used armed RQ-1 Predator drone cost about 4.5 million 
USD in 2009 – a thirtieth of the cost of an F-16 fighter jet.109 In 2012, Human 
Rights Watch reported the cost of the SGR-1 sentry robots in use at the border 
between North and South Korea at no more than 200,000 USD.110  
While the point about physical risk is not effected by the distinction 
between ‘in the loop’ and ‘out of the loop’, AWSs would by definition involve 
less (human) soldiers or staff in supervisory or controlling functions than 
remote-controlled systems, thus lowering expenditures to salaries. AWSs 
would, obviously, furthermore not need to be compensated for the loss of limbs 
or mental functions beyond mechanical repair, nor file for retirement pension 
or health care, whether physical or psychiatric. In the United States, veterans 
are eligible for annuities from the Department of Defense after 20 years of 
                                            
107 See M. Coeckelbergh, 2013, p. 93. 
108 J.L. Otto and B.J. Webber, 2013, p. 6. 
109 M.E. O’Connell, 2012, p. 267. 
110 Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 13. 
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service. In 2012, 2.3 million retirees and surviving relatives received about 52 
billion USD from the federal budget, a near 50 per cent increase since 2002. 
When health care expenditures and salaries to active personnel are included, 
compensation to former and present personnel eats up half the US defence 
budget.111 It is, however, doubtful whether a lower wage-bill in itself lowers 
the threshold to use force. The interesting question would be whether actual 
war fighting would be cheaper with robots, not just maintaining an army.  
The other way in which AWSs might arguably lower the threshold to go 
to war is a more indirect way: through changing the beliefs or values of 
electorates and political leaders regardless of whether the actual dynamic of 
war has changed. The attitude of leaders and the public towards war is clearly 
time and space contingent, and the role of technology is commonly held to 
have a role to play in this variability. Technology has often been cited as the 
solution to making wars cleaner and more humane. There is a common ‘faith 
that technology and its energetic application can fix anything’.112 According to 
Stephen Van Evera, state leaders commonly misunderstand or miscalculate the 
effect of new technologies and tactics. For example, in the 1970s, US Defense 
Secretary James Schlesinger suggested that a major nuclear exchange between 
the Soviet Union and the United States might lead to as few as 15,000 to 
25,000 casualties. Today, these numbers are regarded as vastly 
underestimated.113 Having introduced the machine gun, railway, and cannons 
with higher precision, European states plunged into the twentieth century in 
anticipation of a ‘brisk and merry war’.114  
In addition to their effects being miscalculated, AWSs may conceivably 
also change leaders’ and publics’ attitude towards war by creating a mental, 
and indeed physical, space between themselves and the battlefield. In Just and 
                                            
111 L. Montgomery, 2013. The budgetary crisis and dead-lock of the two congressional parties in the 
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112 R. Johnson, 2002, p. 218. 
113 S. Van Evera, 1999, p. 32. 
114 The infamous words of a German newspaper in 1914, the first year of the First World War. See S. 
Van Evera, 1999, p. 33. See also W.J. Thies, 2009, pp. 63–70. 
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Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer suggests that ‘[u]ntil wars are really fought with 
pawns, inanimate objects and not human beings, warfare cannot be isolated 
from moral life’.115 AWSs present such inanimate objects. Perhaps some 
indeed believe that warfare can be isolated from moral life when AWSs and not 
human soldiers are employed. By this line of reasoning, the use of force could 
be ‘amoralizied’ in people’s minds (see Chapter 6).  
A third way AWSs may lower the threshold of war is if the technology 
is huckstered as being, for example, more discriminate or ‘ethical’ than it really 
is. It is possible that political leaders could attempt to trick their people to get 
‘on board’ with a war-effort. In this context, we may see AWSs as a part of a 
larger pattern by which political leaders attempt to legitimize and reinvigorate 
the use of force in the eyes of the public. While the apparent moral 
absoluteness of the Second World War legitimized the war’s extreme cost, the 
Vietnam War caused moral outrage in the American public, and in other 
countries as well. Both American and Vietnamese casualties were perceived as 
far too high in relation to the danger of a communist regime in Vietnam.  
According to Engels and Saas, the on-going ‘War on Terror’ meets 
acquiescence from the US public in part as a result of the rhetoric used by the 
presidential administration and the Pentagon, aiming to ‘disempower citizens 
by cultivating passivity’. Acquiescent rhetorics facilitate conflict by avoiding 
critical inquiry and deliberation, thus ‘anathema to rhetoric’s nobler, 
democratic ends’.116 The rhetorical woolliness could be seen in association 
with the use of AWSs, where the war similarly is in a sense removed or 
concealed from regular people (on at least one side of the conflict, that is). 
Recent wars involving North American and Western European states have 
displayed an impressive use and range of euphemisms by military officials and 
responsible politicians in order to ‘obfuscate as far as possible the reality of 
what they do’.117 In this discourse, ‘collateral damage’118 means the 
                                            
115 M. Walzer, 2006, p. 64. 
116 J. Engels and W.O. Saas, 2013, p. 231. 
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unintentional killing of civilians, ‘surgical strike’ practically any bombing 
campaign, ‘enhanced interrogation’ means torture, and ‘neutralize’ means to 
kill. NATO states have as far as possible avoided labelling their activities in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya ‘war’ or ‘armed conflict’, rather preferring the 
term ‘operation’.119 The new war rhetoric also includes a few misfired(!) 
tautologies and pleonasms, such as ‘selective targeting’ and ‘coalition of the 
willing’, which clumsily, and we must assume unintentionally, call into 
question the meaning of targeting and of forming coalitions.120  
The hucksterism suggested in the paragraphs above should clearly be 
differentiated from factors that objectively lower the barriers to use force.121 I 
suggest that AWSs does indeed affect the threshold to use force. Most 
importantly, they relieve soldiers of physical risk. On the other hand, so do 
bombers and remote-controlled drones. Thus, in order heighten the threshold to 
resort to the use force; one would have to include all riskless weapons in a 
prohibition. An effect unique to autonomous systems would be their financial 
cost – be it higher or lower than the alternatives.  
Let us now revisit the slippery slope argument for AWSs and jus ad 
bellum: Is the development and use of AWSs morally wrong because it 
potentially lowers the threshold to go to war? Is the slippery slope argument a 
ground for the prohibition of AWSs? 
The core of the slippery slope argument seems to be that AWSs both 
directly, and indirectly through miscalculation or hucksterism, could make war 
                                                                                                                             
118 The euphemism ‘collateral damage’ first appeared in the Vietnam War. See R. Chambers, 2003, p. 
176. 
119 For example, Norwegian authorities have refused to call their activities in Afghanistan ‘war’ of 
armed ‘conflict’, but have nonetheless rewarded soldiers with decorations only available to ‘civilians or 
military personnel who in war or armed conflict in a particularly outstanding way have distinguished 
themselves’ (emphasis added). My translation of ‘sivile og militære som under krig eller væpnet 
konflikt på særlig fremragende måte har utmerket seg’. See Krigskorset med sverd, statutter, 2012, 
Paragraph 1.   
120 See R. Chambers, 2003, pp. 178–79. The war in Iraq also saw the emergence of the concept of 
‘embedding’ journalists into the armed forces to provide news. Jokes about the media being ‘in bed 
with’ the military were obviously irresistible, so in this case, the euphemism failed to serve its (by 
critics alleged) purpose. 
121 R. Chambers, 2003, pp. 176, 179. 
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more palatable.122 As war inevitably leads to harm, lower thresholds to use 
force can only be bad. The underlying maxim appears to be:  
(1) Wars are bad.  
(2) In order to avoid them, one should not allow techniques that 
make war more agreeable.  
However, the positive reformulation of this maxim reveals that while the 
argument may be internally consistent, it is unreasonable and contradictory to 
its purpose of avoiding harm:   
(1) Wars are bad.  
(2) In order to avoid them, one should take measures to make war 
less agreeable, i.e. more brutal and costly. 
Clearly we should neither avoid medicine nor hospitals, nor the study of 
strategy, nor taking precautions. Clearly we should not try to make war as 
brutal as possible, using, for example, inefficient weapons causing superfluous 
injury. There is, it seems, a slippery slope to the slippery slope argument. The 
logical extension of the argument reveals its inconsistency, as it appears to bind 
its subscriber to the implication that humanitarian law, precision weapons, 
armour, and chivalry are bad things.  
The just war tradition solves the problem of distinguishing between fair 
and unfair means of making war less brutal by focusing on the intention and 
cause of the decision-maker, rather than on the material conditions of the 
threshold to resort to the use of force. As Augustine opined, it is the ‘injustice 
of the opposing side that lays on the wise man the duty of waging wars’.123 
According to the just war tradition, the technology per se should have little to 
do with the initiation of the use of force Technologies facilitating morally 
                                            
122 See R.C. Arkin, 2008, p. 7. 
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reprehensible acts should be met by making leaders more accountable and 
prudent, not by banning technology.124 
The distinction between conscious hucksterism and the objective 
threshold to use force, however, is morally important. Intentionally misleading 
or lying to the public would clearly be morally reprehensible according to the 
just war tradition.125 Yet, when it comes to the actual threshold, the ad bellum 
slippery slope argument does not appear to constitute a persuasive ground for 
the prohibition of, or even hostility to, AWSs.  
3.1.2 The Limitations on the Use of Force in Bello 
The slippery slope argument has not been made as vocally for the level of jus 
in bello as it has for ad bellum. Nevertheless, it is plausible that the argument 
has in fact more thrust for the conduct of hostilities. As noted above, the 
possibility of AWSs being better at adhering to the laws of war does not 
necessarily imply that less harm will be caused. Indeed, there is large room for 
violent acts under international humanitarian law. IHL does not prohibit the use 
of force, it merely limits it in certain circumstances. Hence, it is possible for 
AWSs to be better than humans at following the rules for conduct of hostilities 
without thereby causing less harm overall.  
According to some commentators, the use of remote-controlled drones 
produces an emotional distance between the operator and his or her target, a 
‘video-game style interface’, which may ‘negatively influence the moral 
decision making of the human operator’.126 
Conversely, Mark Coeckelbergh finds that surveillance technologies 
such as drone cameras, have made possible an ‘empathic bridging’ by which 
the enemy or target is ‘re-humanized, re-faced, and re-embodied’.127 In contrast 
to traditional artillery and aerial bombing, drones may actually increase the 
                                            
124 The same argument would apply to the (illegal) surveillence facilitated by the new information 
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125 Augustine, 2003, p. 199 (V.12). 
126 K.D. Stephan et al., 2012, p. 1763. See also D. Gregory, 2012, p. 197; P. Alston, 2010, p. 25. 
127 M. Coeckelbergh, 2013, p. 87. 
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threshold to use force in bello.128 AWSs, on the other hand, will by definition 
function without a human in the loop, so the ‘emphatic bridging’ made possible 
by drone cameras will be lost. As noted above, drone pilots have displayed an 
incidence of psychiatric disorders as high as that of pilots of manned aircraft.129 
Another concern, discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter, is that 
the use of AWSs may have a built-in escalatory mechanism. If AWSs were 
programmed to win the battles in which they were to be employed – which is, 
surely, a reasonable assumption – and their operationalization of the 
proportionality rule in IHL was a graduated response to whatever the opponent 
was doing, they could potentially influence the overall course of the conflict 
toward more harm being inflicted.  
3.2 Redistribution of Harm? 
Regardless of whether or not AWSs impacts the threshold to use force, the use 
of so-called riskless tactics and technologies leaves the victim of such tactics 
no choice but to remain passive or to resort to unconventional methods. More 
plainly: the use of unmanned systems may lead to a surge of terrorism.130 
However, such a mechanism is the case with all ‘riskless’ tactics, not just with 
AWSs, for which the novelty is the targeting technique, not the lack of risk. On 
the other hand, we might imagine that AWSs are perceived as more cowardly 
or disrespectful than other ‘riskless’ weapons, thus triggering a more intense 
and desperate opposition by the people against whom they are used.  
Judging by the growing opposition to and awareness of AWSs, this 
appears to be a legitimate concern. There is something about AWSs that 
generates opposition.131 In this context, then, the use of AWSs could generate 
negative consequences in two ways: First, it could produce more harm by 
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129 J.L. Otto and B.J. Webber, 2013, p. 6. 
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motivating more violent opposition, and second, by redistributing harm from 
soldiers to civilians.  
As an objection, however, such a Consequentialist position does not 
appear to be a strong argument for the general and total elimination of AWSs. 
Rather, it is a factual proposition and a caution to the people considering their 
use. With a view to a potential legal ban, there would furthermore probably be 
too many causal links involved between the deployment of AWSs and their 
negative consequences – potentially with improved adherence to IHL as an 
intermediate step.132 The prohibitions of anti-personnel landmines through the 
Mine Ban Treaty and of cluster munitions through the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions on the other hand, were achieved only after long campaigns in 
which the adverse humanitarian consequences of the weapons were shown.133 
Terrorist attacks and other indiscriminate methods are, moreover, already 
illegal under existing international law.134 It appears again that the problem is 
more with practices than with technology. 
3.3 Dictators and Proliferation 
Further down the slippery slope it has been suggested that AWSs may facilitate 
dictatorship. 
[F]rom the perspective of a dictator, fully autonomous weapons would 
be the perfect tool of repression, removing the possibility that human 
soldiers might rebel if ordered to fire on their own people.135 
A central insight from the trials of war criminals after the Second World War 
was that individuals have an obligation to disobey orders in the event of the 
latter conflicting with elementary humanitarian considerations and morality. 
This has long been held as valid for jus in bello – that soldiers should refuse to 
commit internationally wrongful acts like war crimes and genocide – and has 
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lately been a subject also of jus ad bellum – that soldiers should refuse fighting 
in unjust wars.136 Whether AWSs can be used at breach with international law 
remains to be seen – Ron Arkin, for example, proposes to make AWSs 
technically incapable of injuring civilians137 – but it does not appear 
unreasonable to suspect that AWSs could be the perfect weapon for dictators 
without much popular support. After the Second World War, Arendt saw the 
increasing automation as a scary development, contributing technologies beside 
which the German Führer’s gas chambers look like ‘an evil child’s fumbling 
toys’.138 In his essay ‘You and the Atomic Bomb’, George Orwell similarly 
claims that while simple weapons favour revolutions and popular power, 
expensive and technologically advanced weapons and military equipment 
favour dictators and totalitarianism.139 It seems to me that while this argument 
is liable to the counter-argument that it would not be the technology itself that 
was ethically questionable, but the practices of the dictator, it does have some 
merit.  
Finally, some commentators have claimed that once one or a few 
countries have acquired the technology, the weapon systems will proliferate 
across the world.140 John Canning of the US Naval Surface Warfare Center has 
postulated that the weapon systems in question are likely to be proliferated to a 
number of countries, some of them ‘without the same level of safeguards that 
we might build in’.141 While one may well dispute whether the United States 
has in fact built in many ‘safeguards’ for example in their drone programme at 
all, Mr Canning may have a point. Again, however, the argument is not really a 
moral one. Rather, it is a factual proposition a caution: The merit of the 
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argument depends on the morality of deploying AWSs in the first place. If the 
use of AWSs will lead to improved adherence to IHL, their proliferation would 
arguably be a good thing.  
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4 Autonomous Weapon Systems Under the 
Rules for the Conduct of Hostilities  
4.1 Introductory Remarks, and the Limitation on the Choice of 
Means and Methods in Warfare 
A second overarching argument in the Campaign against AWSs’ case is their 
claim that AWSs will not be able to adhere to international humanitarian law. 
Thorough examinations have, however, been few and far between. Most often, 
authors content themselves to suggesting that programming AWSs with 
algorithms that would make them adhere to international would be difficult or 
impossible.142  
4.1.1 Why IHL? 
As most of the academic literature on AWSs, I shall in the following primarily 
discuss IHL. One of the most interesting developments in the Campaign to 
Stop Killer Robot’s advocacy was the informal expert discussions in the CCW 
– an IHL instrument – in May. One should, however, note that IHL would not 
necessarily be the only applicable legal regime. When used as part of a police 
force in law enforcement, for example, the use of AWSs would be subject to 
domestic law and human rights law (HRL). 
While IHL clearly applies to war, the role of human rights law (HRL) in 
armed conflict has been a matter of some contention.143 There is now a growing 
consensus that human rights law (HRL) is not displaced by, but complementary 
to, IHL as a regulatory framework of armed conflict, and that the application of 
one or the other to a large degree depends upon the context in which the 
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violence is taking place.144 Moreover, as IHL as a whole also takes a somewhat 
more sinister view of issues of compliance and practicality, in that respect it is 
more in line with my design choice of employing non-ideal theory (see Chapter 
2). Hence, the following discussion primarily leans on IHL instruments and 
their interpretation.145  
My opting to investigate the legality of AWSs in international armed 
conflicts, then, excludes questions of their use in so-called armed violence or 
criminal conduct regulated by law enforcement rules and HRL. Furthermore, 
my focus on international armed conflicts to a certain extent further reduces 
the universe for which the inferences drawn in this chapter are supposed to 
hold, as there are separate rules for international and non-international armed 
conflicts. Whereas the label ‘international armed conflict’ (IACs) denotes 
conflicts between sovereign states, ‘non-international armed conflicts’ (NIACs) 
covers conflicts between states or governments and armed opposition groups 
within that state. Borderline situations may arise when ideal type non-
international armed conflicts are complicated by third-party intervention or 
cross-border operations.146  
In a historical perspective, the laws of international armed conflict have 
a longer tradition than the laws of non-international, or internal, armed 
conflicts, and their provisions are generally more extensive.147 Following the 
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US doctrine of Air–Sea Battle, I believe the prospect of AWS being used is a 
real one, and perhaps most likely in an IAC featuring high-tech states, as states 
would be much more likely than non-state actors to possess the type of 
equipment necessary for the use of autonomous weaponry (e.g. sophisticated 
cyber capabilities).148 However, many of the core principles of IHL are 
common to both international and non-international armed conflicts, (although 
their interpretation arguably vary across the regimes). In that respect, much of 
the discussion below will have validity for both IACs and NIACs. 
4.1.2 Background 
Whether an armed conflict is of an international or non-international nature, the 
liberty of the parties to the conflict to choose means and methods of warfare is 
not unlimited.149 This is a core principle of IHL, often called the law of armed 
conflict (LOAC), or jus in bello.150 This foundation is considered to be 
customary law, and applicable to both international armed conflicts (IACs) and 
non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).151 
As is the norm in international law, treaties and conventions are 
generally only binding for the states that have ratified them. However, many of 
the most important rules and principles of IHL are considered customary 
international law,152 defined by the Statute for the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) as ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’.153 All the World’s 
States, moreover, have ratified the four Geneva Conventions. In its Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion (1996), the ICJ asserted of Additional Protocol I to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 – arguably the most important instrument 
                                                                                                                             
few interests in extending the rights of potential enemies within. The protection of states from 
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149 Annex to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the Hague, Article 22; API, Article 35(1). 
150 S. Oeter, 2008, p. 126. 
151 D. Fleck, 2008, p. 613–4. 
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codifying the rules for the conduct of hostilities – that ‘the Court recalls that all 
States are bound by those rules in Additional Protocol 1 which, when adopted, 
were merely the expression of the pre-existing customary law, such as the 
Martens Clause’.154 The Court did not further specify which rules they had in 
mind, but labelled the rules of distinction and avoiding unnecessary suffering 
‘cardinal’. One may accordingly safely assume that they are to be covered by 
the Court’s assertion.155 According to the International Committee of the Red 
Cross’ Study on customary international law from 2005, all of the core conduct 
of hostilities rules – distinction between civilians and combatants (including 
the prohibition against indiscriminate weapons), proportionality between ends 
and means, taking precautions in attack, and avoiding unnecessary suffering – 
are customary.156 In practice, this implies that the United States, for example, is 
obliged to follow the core principles of distinction, proportionality, and of 
taking precautions in attacks,157 even though it has not ratified Additional 
Protocol I, in which these principles are codified.158  
The core rules governing the conduct of hostilities are codified in API, 
the most important of which are (1) distinction, (2) proportionality, (3) 
precautions, and (4) avoidance of unnecessary suffering. 159 Numbers (2) and 
(3) are sometimes considered as operationalizations of the ‘cardinal’ principle 
of distinction. In addition to these, the so-called Martens Clause provides that 
the ‘principles of humanity’ and ‘dictates of public conscience’ shall be 
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binding even in cases not covered by the Protocol. In the following section, I 
assess their applicability to the question of employing AWSs. 
A different, but related, question that has been raised by people and 
organizations associated with the international campaign against ‘killer 
robots’,160 is whether the alleged advent of AWSs call for a legal review of 
these weapon system’s legality under IHL, as codified by Article 36 of 
Additional Protocol I:  
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, 
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an 
obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all 
circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of 
international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.161 
Few such reviews appear to have been made, no doubt because these systems 
are still on the drawing board. This thesis may in part be seen as an attempt at 
addressing this paucity. As AWSs are arguably not yet in existence, it is 
obviously difficult to evaluate their adherence to international law. I shall in the 
following rely on current technology, the direction of the development, and the 
suggested solutions for the future. 
4.2 Distinction and Inherently Indiscriminate Weapons  
Parties to an armed conflict may only direct attacks against military objectives. 
According to Stefan Oeter, the norm of distinction, or discrimination,162 
between combatants and civilians is not only to be considered customary 
international law, but arguably ‘constitutes one of the few peremptory norms of 
humanitarian law, and accordingly also part of “ius cogens”’.163 Article 48 of 
Additional Protocol I provides that the state parties must always be able to 
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distinguish between both military personnel and civilians, and between military 
and civilian objects and infrastructure: 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population 
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between 
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives.164 
The status of persons as civilian, combatant, prisoner of war, interned, or 
soldiers hors de combat determines how people affected by armed conflict 
should be treated.165 Attaining the technical capabilities demanded to be able to 
make these distinctions would be a necessary (but by itself insufficient) 
condition for the lawful deployment of AWSs. The first, and fundamental 
question, then, is how, and if, AWSs would be capable of discriminating 
between (lawful) targets and persons enjoying non-combatant immunity. 
Before investigating further, we may note the three ways in which a weapon 
may be used unlawfully: 
First, the use of some weapons is explicitly prohibited by specific legal 
instruments. For example, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibits 
basically any dealings with chemical weapons, including use and 
stockpiling.166 Specifically prohibited weapons, such as the noted chemical 
weapons, bacteriological weapons, blinding lasers, land mines, and cluster 
munitions, have been prohibited on the grounds that they are either of a nature 
to cause unnecessary suffering or cannot be used in accordance with the norm 
of distinction (or both). There is as of yet no specific treaty law for AWSs.167 
Second, even though a weapon is not specifically prohibited by a treaty, 
it may still be categorically unlawful to use if it inherently conflicts with the 
                                            
164 API, Article 48.  
165 K. Ipsen, 2008, p. 78. 
166 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction, Articles 1(1). 
167 The process toward a potential ban or regulation of AWSs was begun  in May 2014, with 
discussions by an expert diplomatic group in the CCW. 
 43 
principles of distinction and avoidance of unnecessary suffering.168 The use of 
such inherently indiscriminate weapons is prohibited regardless of any specific 
instrument.169  
Third, a weapon may be used unlawfully without being inherently 
indiscriminate or in any other way at breach with international law. In its 
advisory opinion on Nuclear Weapons from 1996, the ICJ maintained that 
nuclear weapons were not illegal per se, but would be difficult to use without 
violating the principles of distinction and avoidance of unnecessary 
suffering.170 At the most basic level, however, even standard rifles have a 
maximum range of precision. 
In the case of AWSs, the second of these grounds of unlawfulness 
appears the most interesting: Are AWSs inherently indiscriminate? The UK 
Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict identifies the issue of inherently 
indiscriminate weapons as follows:  
It is prohibited to employ weapons which cannot be directed at a 
specific military objective or the effects of which cannot be limited as 
required by Additional Protocol I and consequently are of a nature to 
strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction.171 
From this we may identify two ways a weapon may be inherently 
indiscriminate. On the one hand, some weapons cannot be targeted against a 
specific target, and are thus prone to be indiscriminate on impact. On the other 
hand, a weapon may have uncontrollable effects, such as incendiary weapons 
designed to start fires. The following two sections are devoted to each of these 
grounds of unlawfulness.  
                                            
168 API, Articles 35 and 48. See also L. Doswald-Beck, 1997. 
169 API, Article 51. See also L. Doswald-Beck, 1997. 
170 ICJ, Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996, Paragraph 95. 
171 The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (UK Manual), 2004, Paragraph 6.4. 
Emphasis added. 
 44 
4.2.1 Indiscriminate Targeting? 
As noted, ‘[i]t is prohibited to employ weapons which cannot be directed at a 
specific military objective’.172 In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory opinion, the 
ICJ postulated that ‘[s]tates must […] never use weapons that are incapable of 
distinguishing between civilian and military targets.’173 To this, Louise 
Doswald-Beck notes that weapons, obviously, cannot themselves distinguish 
between civilians and combatants: 
It remains to be seen what precisely the Court meant by ‘incapable of 
distinguishing between civilian and military targets’. It is obvious that a 
weapon, being an inanimate object, cannot itself make such a 
distinction, for this process requires thought.174  
In the context of AWSs, we are immediately faced with a challenge: In what 
sense is an AWS directed, and in what sense is it a weapon?  
As I have defined it above, an AWS is ‘a weapon that can independently 
select and attack targets.’175 It would be impossible for humans to directly 
engage ‘a specific military objective’ by means of an AWS. This would 
contradict the definition of AWSs as acting ‘independently’. Instead, the 
targeting is performed by the system itself. The AWS identifies a target 
independently, and then releases the weapon. The actual weapon could take 
almost any conceivable form, being anything from a machine gun firing bullets 
to an intercontinental ballistic missile. The novelty introduced by AWSs is not 
the weapon, but the targeting technique.  
In contrast to the UK Manual and the Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion, which both describe unlawful indiscriminate weapons, API does not 
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prohibit indiscriminate weapons, but indiscriminate attacks.176 In Article 51 (4) 
(b) such attacks are defined as ‘[t]hose which employ a method or means of 
combat which cannot be directed against a specific military objective’.177 This 
broadens the class of phenomena covered considerably.  
Furthermore, the definition of AWSs – as weapons that can 
‘independently select and attack targets’178 – implies that the weapons are 
discriminate. A ‘target’ can only be understood as a military object or enemy 
soldier. The whole point of the rule of distinction is precisely that a civilian is 
not a target. Thus, given many civil society actors’ and states’ claim that AWSs 
will not be able to discriminate between soldiers and civilians, their inclusion 
of the word ‘target’ in the definition of AWSs is puzzling.179 For example, the 
Dutch NGO Pax for Peace, founding member of the Stop Killer Robots 
campaign, defines AWSs as ‘weapons that can select and engage targets 
without human intervention.’180 On the other hand, they claim that AWSs 
‘cannot be programmed in such a way that they will be able to make sound 
decisions about who is a combatant and who is a civilian.’181 Such statements 
come dangerously close to tautology. Several of the general statements at the 
CCW expert discussions in May 2014 displayed the same confusion.182 Hence, 
if the word ‘target’ is to be maintained in the definition, the question is less 
about whether AWSs can distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, 
and more about whether it is possible to create AWSs at all.  
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A Note on Drone Strikes 
There are important differences between AWSs and armed drones (UAVs). 
While many drone platforms have automated capabilities, they are remote-
controlled at the crucial moment of kinetic action. An AWS, on the other hand, 
is capable of inflicting lethal harm without any direct human interference. 
Nevertheless, there are some important similarities in how they would identify 
targets. In the following, I discuss how so-called profile or signature strikes 
display important similarities to how AWSs are intended to function.183 
A general trait of many modern conflicts is that the tactics employed by 
one or more of the belligerent parties make discrimination between combatants 
and civilians difficult to conduct in practice. Arguably, most wars since the 
Second World War display a wide use of so-called fourth generation warfare 
tactics (4GW), such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and immersion in the local 
population.184 Parties using such tactics seldom wear uniforms, and generally 
do their best not to distinguish themselves from the civilian population (which 
is a requirement of IHL),185 precisely to leech on the protection afforded to 
civilians. This makes it very difficult for their (for now human) adversaries to 
distinguish them from civilians. 
An increasingly used counter-tactic, employed on a large scale in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Gaza,186 is the use of armed drone aircraft 
(unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs). With this tactic, targets are selected 
through the camera of a drone, often based not on whether they are engaging in 
hostile activities or are identified as legitimate targets, but based on 
predetermined criteria, such as location, gender, or ‘suspicious’ looks or 
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activity.187 In their report on drone strikes, Stanford Law School concluded that 
under the drone programme, ‘enemies’ were targeted based on ‘signatures’ 
associated with terrorist activities: 
Under Obama, the [drone] program expanded to include far more 
‘profile’ or so-called ‘signature’ strikes based on a ‘pattern of life’ 
analysis. According to US authorities, these strikes target ‘groups of 
men who bear certain signatures, or defining characteristics associated 
with terrorist activity, but whose identities aren’t known.’ […] The 
Times also reported that some in the Obama administration joke that 
when the CIA sees ‘three guys doing jumping jacks,’ they think it is a 
terrorist training camp.188 
The RQ-9 Reaper, produced by General Atomics, can ‘self-navigate and search 
out targets, but a remote operator […] makes the final decision to release the 
missiles’.189 In the future it would be possible to replace the human drone 
operator with computer algorithms completely.190 While there are still humans 
controlling the actual drone strikes, the selection of targets is not in any 
meaningful sense made by the drone operator, but a priori by predetermined 
criteria, or ‘signatures’. Often, what is targeted is not even an actual person, but 
the SIM card associated with a suspected enemy.191 Presumably, the targeting 
method of AWSs would be similar, i.e. based on sensorial recognition of 
predetermined, objective criteria.192 ‘Gait recognition’ is one such suggested 
discrimination-technique, by which persons can be identified by their looks and 
‘specific walk’.193  
The qualitative difference between today’s drones, with pilots or 
operators ‘in the loop’, and tomorrow’s AWSs with humans ‘out of the loop’, 
has often been stressed. However, there is clearly a massive grey area between 
                                            
187 D. Greenfield, 2013. 
188 Stanford and NYU, 2012, pp. 12–3. 
189 N. Sharkey, 2008, pp. 14–5. 
190 A. Quince, 2013. An algorithm is a ‘process or set of rules to be followed in calculations or other 
problem-solving operations, especially by a computer’ (OED, 2014, ‘Algorithm’). 
191 J. Scahill and G. Greenwald, 2014. 
192 See R.C. Arkin, 2008, p. 11. 
193 T. Spenser, 2012. 
 48 
AWSs guided by artificial intelligence and remote-controlled automated 
weapons and platforms. 
Drone strikes have led to a large number of civilian deaths; allegedly, 
children, people trying to rescue or tend to the wounds of drone strike victims, 
funeral processions, and wedding guests are among those who have been 
targeted.194 Proponents of the drone strike programme claim that drones in fact 
provide better opportunities to distinguish between civilians and combatants 
than alternative means and methods. For example, the MQ-1 Predator and the 
MQ-9 Reaper – some of the most used armed drones – can stay in the air for up 
to fourteen hours, compared to a maximum of four hours of F-16 fighter jets 
and A-10 ground attack aircraft.195 This allows strikes to be made on the basis 
of better intelligence. Compared to cruise missiles or intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, which are released far away from the intended target, the drone 
platform permits the missile to be launched much closer to the target. This 
gives their operators the opportunity to change their minds at a much later stage 
should they observe unlawful targets in the targeted area. By contrast, the 
cruise missiles aimed for Osama bin Laden by the United States in 1998 were 
programmed to hit the area in which he was presumed to be located four to six 
hours after firing the missiles.196 Such attacks are clearly both bad tactics and 
questionable under international law.197 
However, while the technology of the drones does allow for better 
distinction than many other systems, they have not always been used to that 
effect. Military strategists David Kilcullen and Andrew M. Exum assert that 
drones are essentially a tactic, or actually a piece of technology, that became a 
strategy. The problem is not primarily with the technology, but with how it is 
put to use.198 Furthermore, while the intelligence gathering made possible by 
                                            
194 M. Zenko, 2013, p. 14; J. Becker and S. Shane, 2012; C. Whitlock, 2011; G. Greenwald, 2012. 
195 W. Wheeler, 2012. 
196 M. Zenko, 2013, p. 6. 
197 Note, however, that the assassination attempt at bin-Laden would not have been regulated by IHL, 
as there was no armed conflict between the parties involved. Rather, one would have to draw upon 
HRL and jus ad bellum. 
198 D. Kilcullen and A.M. Exum, 2009. 
 49 
drones is better than that of fighter jets, it does not compare to having eyes and 
ears on the ground.199 A recent study found that ‘unmanned vehicles were 10 
times more likely than conventional aircraft to cause civilian casualties’.200 
 Few disagree that the US drone strike policy is in need of reform, and 
according to R.C. Arkin, development of AWSs is precisely the way forward. 
He argues that AWSs could act more ethically than human beings on the 
battlefield, not least because they would not have human emotions, which are 
often responsible for rash decisions and thus unlawful acts.  
It is not my belief that unmanned systems will be able to be perfectly 
ethical in the battlefield, but I am convinced that they can perform more 
ethically than human soldiers are capable of. Unfortunately the trends in 
human behavior in the battlefield regarding adhering to legal and ethical 
requirements are questionable at best.201 
The technology available today is by all accounts far away from a scenario in 
which robots would be capable of engaging legitimate targets and not civilians, 
with or without uniformed enemies.202 Compare, for example, the quote 
directly above, to a description of Samsung’s SGR-A1 sentry robot used at the 
‘demilitarized zone’ (DMZ) between North and South Korea, one of the most 
sophisticated weapon systems available today. Although it can distinguish 
people from rocks, trees, and potentially animals, it cannot distinguish between 
combatants and non-combatants: 
[SGR-A1] is equipped with sophisticated color vision sensors that can 
identify a person entering the DMZ, even at night under only starlight 
illumination. Since any person entering the DMZ is automatically 
presumed to be an enemy, it is not necessary to separate friend from 
foe.203 
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While engineers have been able to create robots that mimic human movements, 
and computer processors are capable of mathematical calculations by far 
superior to anything a human could do, creating robots with effective language 
functions – not just automatic recordings and speech recognizing algorithms – 
has been laborious and unfruitful. Acquiring language would require the 
capacity to interact with other agents under continuously changing 
circumstances, in that sense similar to the chaos of battlefield operations.204 
However, complications and difficulties in the present do not imply that robots 
will never reach the level of understanding necessary to adhere to the norm of 
distinction. To the contrary, the technological development is moving fast: 
Innovations, adaptations, and uses in […] robotics, are being discovered 
at an unprecedented rate in a culture of technological uncertainty, which 
provides very little time and minimal governance in order to ask the 
question of not can we do this, but should we do this.205 
The question of whether robots could discriminate between combatants and 
non-combatants is essentially a factual one, boiling down to whether robots can 
be made to think and function like human beings. This is, incidentally, also 
how the US Department of Defense phrases it in their most recent roadmap for 
unmanned systems: ‘In simplistic terms, the algorithms must act as the human 
brain does’.206  
4.2.2 Uncontrollable Effects? 
Above I have argued that future robots may be capable of discriminating 
between lawful and unlawful targets when using force. In this regard it is 
important to stress that the weapon will not be directed by human commanders 
or soldiers, but by the autonomous system or robot. If humans could in fact 
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direct the weapon, the robot or system would not be autonomous, but 
automated or remote-controlled. The principle of distinction, however, goes 
beyond the immediate targeting and impact of an attack. It also concerns 
longer-term consequences of an attack. Article 51 of Additional Protocol I 
further defines indiscriminate attacks as: 
Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which 
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each 
such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or 
civilian objects without distinction.207 
This temporal dimension of the rule of distinction would, for example, apply to 
nuclear or other radiation or destruction of vital infrastructure. Again, the term 
‘method or means’ is important. The question here is not whether the actual 
weapon is indiscriminate, but whether the autonomous system is. Hence, the 
question must be whether the autonomous system can be limited. This has both 
a spatial component (discussed above) and a temporal component. The 
temporal component – how the system would be deactivated after completing a 
mission – may seem trivial, but in fact, it is not, as it spills over into what in 
robotics is known as the ‘human interference issue’.208 At a minimum, creating 
simple ‘on/off’ buttons would be a necessity. Due to their financial cost, 
however, we might reasonably expect that military commanders and other 
decision-makers would be reluctant to leave valuable technology in the hands 
of the enemy. As Lin et al. puts it, future robots will be better than humans at 
assessing risk: 
We cannot trust humans to determine risks for autonomous robots, not 
least because we are often psychologically, emotionally, and cognitively 
ill-equipped to accurately understand and estimate the risk. As robots 
grow in their lethality, speed, and autonomy, this problem will only 
become more acute.209 
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Nevertheless, assuming that ‘on/off’ buttons are created, it appears 
unreasonable to suggest that AWSs will be intrinsically indiscriminate or 
impossible to limit in their effects along the time dimension. According to 
Schmitt, the ‘U.S. Department of Defense is exceptionally sensitive to the 
human interface issue’.210 In the directive issued by the US Department of 
Defense in 2012, decision-makers were obliged to design ‘human-machine 
interfaces for autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems to be readily 
understandable to trained operators, provide traceable feedback on system 
status, and provide clear procedures for trained operators to activate and 
deactivate system functions’.211  
4.3 Proportionality and Military Necessity 
The norm of distinction is not peremptory in the sense that all attacks causing 
civilian deaths are unlawful. The principle of distinction must constantly be 
weighed against military necessity, and is mediated through the norm of 
proportionality. In line with realist reasoning, it was once held by some writers 
that military necessity – winning the war or a battle – prevailed over 
humanitarian considerations such as avoiding civilian casualties. Today, this 
claim is decisively refuted. In the so-called subsequent Nuremberg Trials, for 
example, the United States Military Tribunal in United States v List ruled that 
‘military necessity or expediency do not justify a violation of positive rules’.212 
All civilian casualties must be measured against the importance of the 
operation. A small tactical advantage is not sufficient to justify large numbers 
of civilian casualties. Thus, the prohibition against the use of indiscriminate 
weapons also includes a proportionality clause:  
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: […] An 
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
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which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.213 
Here, an even more careful judgement is called for than the more instrumental 
obligation to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between active 
combatants and soldiers hors de combat, including injured and surrendered 
soldiers. The proportionality rule is very complex, obliging parties to assess the 
commensurability between means and methods on the one hand, and the 
military advantage anticipated on the other. In order to adhere to this rule, then, 
an AWS would have to have a clear understanding of when anticipated civilian 
harm would be excessive in relation to the military advantage gained. This 
would necessitate an understanding of military grand strategy, operational 
issues, and tactics. The AWS would furthermore have to be able to 
comprehend continual changes in goals and objectives, internal changes to their 
relative importance, and the anticipated military utility of achieving them. 
Ultimately, these understandings would have to be operationalized as the 
number of civilian casualties (and damage to the natural environment)214 these 
goals are worth, assuming that the other rules for the conduct of hostilities are 
already met. These are very complicated tasks, that only humans are capable of 
today. According to Peter Asaro, ‘[h]uman understanding, rationality, and 
judgement exceed any conceivable system of fixed rules or any computational 
system’.215 
The answer to the question ‘what is excessive?’ is, as Yoram Dinstein 
understatedly puts it, ‘not exact science’.216 The application of IHL requires an 
operationalization of abstract principles, to which there is a certain reciprocal 
element. 
IHL is intended as a de-escalating mechanism, and it may well be 
disputed whether robots are able to grasp this. Proportionality can be 
operationalized in two ways: First, it can be determined before a mission how 
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important its success is. In the case of AWSs it appears very difficult and 
labour intensive to re-programme the software for every mission, so while this 
is the standard way to operationalize the proportionality rule with human 
soldiers it may less viable for robots. Second, the proportionality rule can be 
applied as a graduated response to what the enemy is doing, in other words 
operationalized as ‘the principle of minimum use of force’.217 This appears 
more feasible when deploying AWSs. A major problem, however, is that this 
graduated response has the implication – particularly when both sides are 
equipped with AWSs – of being an escalatory mechanism; obviously, both 
sides are attempting to win the battle, which may be equally important for 
them. ‘Minimum’ does by no means imply ‘minimal’. Thus, AWSs may be 
militarily less useful than hoped, due to their capacity to influence the conflict 
on a general, strategic level. Granting machines control of the use of force 
could potentially lead to the balance between military necessity and 
humanitarian considerations being shifted in favour of the former. 
However, as with the discussion of the rule of distinction above, it is 
very difficult to assess the legality of systems that are not yet in use, and it is 
not clear that humans are unequivocally better than computers at calculating 
proportionality, or at least the number of civilian casualties resulting from any 
given strike. The US military in fact already uses computer software to aid 
their proportionality assessments.218 Furthermore, no weapon, and arguably no 
means nor method of war, have been prohibited on the grounds of being 
inherently disproportionate.219 Disproportion would have to be determined in 
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light of the military utility of the attack, and the actions of the AWS on the 
battlefield. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which the risk of 
harming civilians was limited. The proportionality rule does not protect enemy 
combatants. According to Dinstein, there is nothing legally wrong with a one-
sided military victory: 
There is no legal fault in a one-sided military success of a belligerent 
party benefiting from supremacy of means and methods of warfare from 
pursuing a ‘zero casualties policy’, leaving its own combatants intact, 
while inflicting horrific losses on the enemy’s armed forces.220 
4.4 Precautions and Avoiding Unnecessary Suffering 
Even if an AWS could properly discriminate between combatants and civilians, 
the effects of it could be limited in time, and it could judge the relation between 
military advantage and harm to civilians, its actions could still be unlawful on 
the grounds of breaching the rule of taking precautions in attack. Article 57 of 
API reads that ‘[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be 
taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects’.221 
Commenting on this rule, Stefan Oeter explains that ‘[a]ttacks against military 
objectives shall be conducted with maximum precautions to protect the civilian 
population’, and furthermore that ‘[t]he rule prohibits not only attacks against 
the general civilian population but also attacks likely to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects which are 
excessive in relation to the expected advantage’.222 Moreover, the provision 
specifies the following:  
An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the 
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that 
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the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof.223 
Thus, belligerents are required to assess the proportionality between ends and 
means also during the course of the fighting. Arkin proposes that AWSs could 
be programmed with algorithms for ‘case-based reasoning’, which could 
presumably adjust the system’s interpretation of the proportionality rule prior 
to a specific mission.224 On the other hand, even this could prove too crude an 
application, as the importance of the mission and thus advantage anticipated 
will often change during the course of the fighting. According to Janina Dill, 
the balancing between military advantage and civilian losses implied by the 
proportionality requirement is especially: 
The requirement to balance without a specified mechanism for how to 
do so is difficult on its own. It is further complicated by disagreement 
over who counts as a civilian with immunity from attack and over what 
exactly constitutes a military advantage.225  
Moreover, IHL also provides that unless circumstances do not permit, attacks 
which may affect civilians should be preceded by a warning in order for 
civilians to escape the area.226 Admittedly, this would defeat the purpose of 
targeted killings and assassinations as in the case with the drone strikes 
discussed above. However, there is clearly a difference between civilian 
casualties when effective warning have been given and when it has not. A 
strategy based on assassinations without due warning is certainly questionable 
given existing IHL. On the other hand, one may reasonably hold that if 
technology advances far enough so that a machine can adhere to the norms of 
distinction and proportionality, it could also be made to take precautions. 
Another concern is how one might practically go about surrendering to a 
robot or weapon system. This relates to the technological challenges of 
performing the necessary distinction between combatants and non-combatants 
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discussed above, but goes beyond the kinetic action. The robot would, for 
example, have to be capable of distinguishing between active combatants and 
surrendered or surrendering soldiers, and others hors de combat.227 
In addition to the rules of distinction, precautions, and proportionality, 
there is a strong rule in IHL calling combatants to use means and methods 
aiming at avoiding unnecessary suffering for combatants.228 The rule of 
avoiding unnecessary suffering has been expressed in several legal instruments 
banning specific weapons. The first convention banning a specific weapon was 
the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which banned explosive and incendiary 
projectiles weighing under 400 grams. These weapons caused suffering and 
injury deemed excessive to what was required to put enemy soldiers out of 
action. Several other conventions have followed, banning weapons as 
technology provided new means of killing and maiming, such as the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Mine Ban Treaty, and the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
 In the case of AWSs, the question of avoiding unnecessary suffering is 
arguably less applicable. Although one could imagine renegade Terminator-
style robots torturing enemy soldiers or civilians, such a picture would 
probably be more fiction than fact.229 I shall not speculate here on what actual 
weapon autonomous systems will be equipped with, but focus on the aspects 
unique to AWSs. The revolutionary aspect of autonomous robotics is not the 
weapon itself, but the operational deployment, as identification, selection, and 
engagement of targets would be made independently of human control. Hence, 
a robot using chemical weapons would clearly be illegal, but a robot using 
more conventional, lawful, weapons would not be illegal on those grounds. 
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4.5 The Martens Clause and Humanity 
The Martens Clause is a provision included in several IHL instruments. It has 
its name from Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens, a Russian delegate to the Hague 
Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907, and is on the face of it an attempt at 
filling unforeseeable loopholes in IHL. At the time of its conception, however, 
it was a way of finding common ground at the diplomatic conference at The 
Hague. The Martens Clause has featured prominently in civil society actors’ 
case against AWSs.230 In it, direct reference is made on the one hand to 
customary international law, and on the other to the somewhat more woolly 
‘principles of humanity’ and ‘dictates of public conscience’. API codifies the 
Clause as the following: 
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international 
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and 
authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public 
conscience.231  
While the principles of distinction, proportionality, and unnecessary suffering 
have particular, well-defined meanings in IHL, the ‘principle of humanity’ 
referred to in the Martens Clause is much less precise. Although the principles 
of humanity appear in legal instruments, its legal basis is less strong than for 
the other major principles.232 The interpretations of what the Martens Clause 
implies have been many. Legal scholar Antonio Cassese identifies three broad 
approaches:233  
First, one might view the clause as operating on the level of 
interpretation. By this account, the invocation of ‘humanity’ and ‘public 
conscience’ implies that in the absence of international rules, or when doubt 
arises, belligerents are not free to do as they please, but are nonetheless 
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required to make humanitarian considerations.234 While this is probably the 
most widespread interpretation of the Clause, such a reading reduces the 
Clause to a re-statement of a long-standing principle of interpretation, and is 
thus pointless, Cassese argues.235 Cassese himself holds that ‘humanity’ should 
be interpreted in line with human rights law, i.e. that the ‘humanity’ of IHL is 
the same as the ‘human’ in human rights.236 How one might actually apply this 
to IHL, however, he does not say. 
Second, one might interpret the Martens Clause more radically as an 
independent source of international law.237 This is apparently what HRW is 
doing when they contend that ‘autonomous weapons would likely contravene 
the Martens Clause, which prohibits weapons that run counter to the “dictates 
of public conscience.”’238 While this interpretation seems to fit well with the 
wording of the Clause, there appears to be no evidence of these sources ever 
having been relied upon independently of other sources of international law 
either in case law or in state practice.239  
Theorists of a third strand view the ‘principles of humanity’ and ‘public 
conscience’ simply as having inspired and motivated the development of IHL. 
This interpretation would seem to fit with the actual practice and development 
of humanitarian law, but it fails to explain why the Clause has been included in 
legal instruments. According to Larsen, Cooper, and Nystuen, the ‘principles of 
humanity’ may be more or less equated with the humanitarian considerations 
IHL is intended to protect. The Clause may to some extent be considered an 
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archaic remnant, as API codifies the principles the Clause alludes to in a much 
more precise manner.240 The Clause would not appear to present a silver bullet 
for the campaigners working for a comprehensive ban on AWSs. 
Nevertheless, the rules of distinction, precautions, and unnecessary 
suffering are normative guidelines, aiming to minimize the negative 
humanitarian impact of war. Some Realist commentators have argued that IHL 
is simply a way for states to pursue their self-interests, and that its moral 
content is overstated.241 On the other hand, self-interest and morality are not 
necessarily opposing motivations, nor do states’ intentions preclude the moral 
content of IHL.  
What does it mean to act ‘humanely’? In IHL, this injunction generally 
concerns the people acted upon in warfare; it is their ‘humanity’ that is due 
protection. The intentions or temperament – the ‘humanity’ – of the active side 
is less prominent.242 Linking the aspect of ‘humanity’ to the passive side is, 
however, in one sense contrary to conventional speech – one is tempted to say 
‘public conscience’ – in which one might label someone one considered to be 
especially cruel, numb, or without emotion as ‘inhuman’.243 Indeed, it is a 
thought-provoking question whether AWSs – being inanimate objects – can act 
‘humanely’. R.C. Arkin certainly thinks so: ‘I would hope that our unmanned 
systems can act in a more humane manner and in a manner more obviously 
consistent with the LOW’.244 A related question, addressed in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis – in which the focus is shifted from ‘harm’ to ‘the harmer’ – is whether 
an act can be inhumane without having inhumane effects. 
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4.6 Concluding Remarks on the Rules for the Conduct of 
Hostilities 
From the discussion above, many questions remain unanswered. It appears that 
the current technology is far away from meeting the IHL criteria, particularly in 
urban conflicts and in conflicts featuring non-state actors that are unlikely to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. Of the norms discussed 
above, the norm of proportionality appears the most difficult, requiring AWS to 
be able to balance military advantage against civilian harm. However, it must 
be stressed that these are factual claims, susceptible to the actual technological 
development. The first scene on which autonomous systems could conceivably 
function in adherence with the principles of distinction and precautions, would 
probably be aerial and naval operations. According to US colonel T.X. 
Hammes, the typical ground operation includes 160,000 objects all involved 
need to be aware of, making the use of AWSs in ground operations ‘extremely 
difficult’. In contrast, a typical air operation includes 1000 objects of 
concern.245  Compared to the confusion of modern urban warfare, aerial and 
naval operations are more easily oriented. It is usually easier to gain oversight 
of the battlefield, and aircraft and ships are required to be properly marked.246 
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5 Responsibility 
The technological development is currently at a stage where it is difficult to 
imagine how AWSs could operate in accordance with the rules for the conduct 
of hostilities. AWSs would presumably select their targets based on some sort 
of quantifiable or otherwise computer-friendly information, in that way similar 
to how many drone strikes are conducted today. Signature strikes and other 
drone strikes based on metadata and SIM card tracing are questionable 
considering the rules for the conduct of hostilities, as they do not appear easily 
squared with the principle of distinction and precautions.247 The proportionality 
rule appears even more difficult for AWSs, as the balancing between ends and 
means required by the rule is subject to constant changes pursuant to the 
volatility of strategic and tactical developments. If possible at all, translating 
this into computer algorithms would provide a monumental task.  
While the increased compliance to IHL envisioned by Arkin is 
endearing, it seems utopian to think that AWSs would function faultlessly. In 
April 2008, several TALON SWORDs – automated robots equipped with 
machine guns – were taken out of service in Iraq, following claims that they 
had turned their guns against ‘friendly’ soldiers. US authorities denied the 
story, but confirmed that there had been malfunctions.248 In 2007, an automated 
cannon employed by the South African army killed nine ‘friendly’ soldiers and 
wounded 14 others.249  
As Human Rights Watch (HRW) puts it: ‘If [unlawful] killing were 
done by a fully autonomous weapon […] the question would become: whom to 
hold responsible?’250 In an article from 2013, Aaron Johnson and Sidney Axinn 
have an easy answer to HRW’s question: 
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The chain of command is well established for all weapon systems, 
including remotely piloted drones. However, when the robot is 
controlled by a program, not a human, the usual court-martial pattern 
may not be useable. […] This is really a detail […]. If it is a matter of a 
robot mistake, for instance due to a programming error, then the same 
rules that govern quality assurance and verification of toasters or 
conventional weapons should apply. If the weapons misfired because of 
a design defect, the manufacturer could be held liable.251 
On the other hand, though, we might not be content with the comparison of 
autonomous weapon systems to toasters, and it might be both legally and 
morally impermissible to try a manufacturer for war crimes. By definition, 
autonomous robots have a form of agency of their own, making the causal link 
between humans and the actual weapon much more blurry.  
The following chapter mainly addresses the question of responsibility 
for war crimes in the absence of intent by humans. Possible crimes include 
grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, such as wilful killing, extensive 
destruction of property not justified by military necessity, killing or wounding 
a soldier hors de combat, and intentionally directing attacks against buildings 
dedicated to religion, education, art, science, or charitable purposes.252 Trying 
suspects of war crimes can be very important for peace-building, norm 
projection, and for the justice in the eyes of the people having lost someone 
under terrible circumstances.253 
5.1 State Responsibility  
In traditional international law, the state as a whole bears responsibility for 
unlawful acts committed by all state organs, including its armed forces.254 
There is no criminal punishment in traditional international law; rulings are 
generally reparative, obliging the guilty state to compensate the damage done, 
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and to terminate the unlawful act if it has not already been ceased.255 This holds 
true also for IHL, for which Article 91 of API provides that: 
A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions 
or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay 
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons 
forming part of its armed forces.256  
In the context of AWSs, the use of the word ‘persons’ in API is troubling. 
However, the wording of the corresponding article common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 establishes that ‘[n]o High Contracting Party shall be 
allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party in respect of 
breaches referred to in the preceding article.’257 It would be reasonable to hold 
a state responsible for all its units in the field, regardless of them being natural 
persons or not. 
5.2 Individual Criminal Liability? 
As international law has traditionally been a matter of regulating the affairs of 
states, individual responsibility is historically less pronounced on the 
international arena. Yet, recent decades have seen an increasing 
individualization of responsibility also in international law through the 
development of international criminal law (ICL), which establishes criminal 
liability deriving from IHL, HRL, and domestic law.258 ICL is less extensive 
than most systems of domestic law, criminal acts being restricted by the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court to genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.259  
According to Cassese, the general principle of ICL is that no one may be 
held responsible for crimes committed by another person. Furthermore, a 
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person may be held criminally liable only if he or she is somehow culpable.260 
The Rome Statute codifies this as ‘intent and knowledge’.261 Although ‘person’ 
could imply legal personhood in some contexts, individual criminal 
responsibility in ICL should be interpreted as pertaining to natural persons. 
Indeed, the Rome Statute makes this explicit: ‘The Court shall have jurisdiction 
over natural persons.’262 While an AWS in theory is autonomous, and must 
thus be viewed as responsible for its actions in terms of strict causality, it is not 
a natural person, and it would seem unreasonable that an AWS could be held 
criminally responsible for its actions on the battlefield. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, such a position would require trying AWSs at The Hague or other 
competent courts should they be suspected of having committed international 
crimes.  
Robert Sparrow – tongue-in-cheek – suggests that we might ‘punish the 
culprit’, or ‘we might administer corporeal punishment by damaging the 
machine in some way, or perhaps by administering electric shocks to those 
electrodes through which it senses damage in combat.’263 Assuming that AWSs 
would be programmed with algorithms requiring it in some way to adhere to 
IHL, it would furthermore be very difficult to imagine how they could breach 
with the law – and thus their software – with ‘intent and knowledge’. Breaches 
would, by definition, be malfunctions. 
Citing the Roman philosopher Seneca’s view that ‘[a] sword is never a 
killer; it is a tool in the killer’s hand’,264 Michael Schmidt asserts that the 
worries of HRW – that there is no one to hold responsible for the actions of 
AWSs – are unfounded. He identifies two channels of responsibility, that of the 
programmer, and that of command responsibility.  
The mere fact that a human might not be in control of a particular 
engagement does not mean that no human is responsible […]. A human 
must decide how to program the system. Self-evidently, that individual 
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would be accountable for programming it to engage in actions that 
amounted to war crimes. Moreover, the commander or civilian 
supervisor of that individual would be accountable for those war crimes 
if he or she knew or should have known that the autonomous weapon 
system had been so programmed.265 
When looking more closely at the responsibility of programmers (for 
international crimes, not commercial claims), however, the picture is 
complicated: Indeed, since the software is so complex, it cannot be written or 
micro-planned by any one person; robot software consists of millions of lines 
of coding written by large teams.266 The complexity precludes anyone from 
having complete oversight. Hence, while the company responsible for the 
production of an AWS could potentially be accountable for commercial 
malfunction-claims, it would seems unreasonable to hold an individual 
programmer responsible of war crimes, unless it could be established that the 
malicious software was programmed with ‘intent and knowledge’.267 
According to Lin et al., it appears very questionable whether any one 
programmer could be held accountable, or even have complete oversight over 
how the system would work in all circumstances. Even though every line of 
coding is internally consistent, it could prove malevolent in aggregate. 
Perhaps robot ethics has not received the attention it needs, at least in 
the US, given a common misconception that robots will do only what 
we have programmed them to do. Unfortunately, such a belief is a 
sorely outdated, harking back to a time when computers were simpler 
and their programs could be written and understood by a single person. 
Now, programs with millions of lines of code are written by teams of 
programmers, none of whom knows the entire program; hence, no 
individual can predict the effect of a given command with absolute 
certainty, since portions of large programs may interact in unexpected, 
untested ways.268 
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere in this thesis, the novelty of AWSs is that 
they are not tools, as Schmidt and others appear to hold, but must by virtue of 
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their definition as self-governing entities be considered to have a form of 
agency of their own. 
5.3 Command Responsibility? 
The fact that AWSs themselves cannot be held individually responsible does 
not mean that they operate outside of the sphere of ICL. The doctrine of 
command responsibility, present in both IHL and ICL, ensures a hierarchical 
scheme of accountability, by which military and civilian leaders are responsible 
for the actions of the soldiers they command. This is what Schmidt has in mind 
when he reassures HRW, claiming that their worry is ‘based on a false 
premise’.269 The superior does not assume responsibility for the criminal acts of 
his or her subordinates directly, but may be charged guilty of having allowed a 
crime to happen.270 They can, then, be held liable as aiders and abetters.271 AP I 
was the first legal instrument to comprehensively codify command 
responsibility. 
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was 
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or 
disciplinary responsibility […] if they knew, or had information which 
should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, 
that he was committing or about to commit such a breach and if they did 
not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress 
the breach.272 
As in most systems of domestic law, there are two conditions that must be 
fulfilled for an act to be punishable: First, a crime must have been committed 
(actus reus or ‘guilty act’). This is the objective element of the crime, worded 
in AP I as ‘a breach […] was committed’. While the objective element will not 
be discussed here, the second, mental, element is of more interest in our regard: 
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The commander must in some way be culpable for the crime (mens rea or 
‘guilty mind’). While the Rome Statute uses similar language for the mens rea 
requirement – ‘either knew or […] should have known’273 – the wording in the 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) is somewhat more liberal, reading as ‘knew or had reason to know’.274  
The mens rea for command responsibility is somewhat unclear in the 
legal literature and case law due to different interpretations of what ‘should 
have known’ and similar formulations actually imply.275 It is also unclear what 
‘all feasible measures’ implies in practice, and how to draw the line between 
purpose, knowledge, recklessness, negligence, and strict liability, and which of 
these are actually punishable under ICL.276  
5.3.1 Singular Events 
The commander is responsible for repressing crimes, and, if committed, for 
punishing them.277 In the context of AWSs, punishment – at least in the 
conventional sense – will not be possible. The important remaining question, 
then, is whether civil and military commanders are in a position where they can 
in fact know whether an AWS is, or is about to, commit a crime. Puzzlingly, 
the mens rea criterion has not been much discussed in the literature on AWSs. 
Most authors content themselves to suggesting that there appear to be some 
issues regarding responsibility, or simply claim that command responsibility 
solves the problem. 
Based on the discussion above, however, any AWS would have to be 
programmed with very complicated software, requiring the system to adhere to 
the rules for conduct of hostilities.278 If such software could in fact be 
constructed, it would appear that AWSs by definition would have to be 
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expected to adhere to IHL, unless someone knew or should have known that 
there was a malfunction in the software. This stands in contrast to how a 
military commander must engage with human soldiers, as the morale and 
emotional state of the soldiers is likely to influence their decisions on the 
battlefield. This is something the commander should be expected to take into 
account.279 Robots, on the other hand, would not have emotions comparable to 
those of humans.280  The robot’s software, would – at least in theory – restrict 
the system from committing war crimes. Moreover, if this software were too 
complicated for any one programmer to fully understand, it might be 
unreasonable to expect military or political commanders to do so. As the ICTY 
argued in Čelebići, ‘international law cannot oblige a superior to do the 
impossible.’281  
If, as suggested by Arkin,282 so called ‘case-based reasoning’ is indeed 
programmed, a commander could conceivably be guilty of employing a too 
aggressive ‘case’, thus potentially violating the proportionality rule. For 
example, the actual weapon employed could be too heavy or imprecise. This 
would, however, negate Arkin’s hope that AWSs would be incapable of 
violating international law through restraints in the software.283 Anyway, if 
such deployment was carried through, it could potentially be viewed as 
‘reckless’. It is, however, not at all clear whether recklessness is included in the 
mens rea requirement in international command responsibility.284 The 
suggested mental state required has varied between seemingly strict liability in 
Yamashita (i.e. only actus reus required for criminal liability),285 to a rejection 
of ‘criminal negligence as a basis of liability’ in Bagilishema.286 The recent 
development of ICL appears to go in the direction of a stricter interpretation 
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than that of Yamashita.287 Ordering the use of too aggressive a case could 
furthermore trigger a separate mode of liability called ‘ordering’ or 
‘instigating’. Constituting an act of itself, ordering or instigating would not 
trigger liability under command responsibility, which should be understood as 
a failure to act.288 
In his often-cited article ‘Killer Robots’, Robert Sparrow argues that the 
only viable solution to the accountability gap is to ‘assign responsibility to an 
appropriate individual – presumably the commanding officer’. This would be 
the ‘only way of meeting our obligation to enemy combatants to ensure that 
someone can be held responsible if they are killed unjustly.’289 ‘Assigning’ 
responsibility in the absence of ‘intent and knowledge’, or some form of guilt, 
however, is not possible under existing ICL/IHL, and would conflict with most 
people’s sense of justice. Substitutionary atonement is a central element of the 
Christian religion, but would, I contend, not be acceptable in the context of 
AWSs. 
5.3.2 Failure to Control an AWS Over Time 
As with the discussion of inherently indiscriminate weapons in Chapter 4, it 
could be fruitful to distinguish between singular events or immediate impact, 
and attacks going on over a more extended period of time. While a commander 
could probably not be held responsible for singular acts of an AWS (assuming 
that he or she did not know that there was a malfunction in the software or 
hardware), unlawful acts going on over a longer period of time would be more 
challenging. A commander who knowingly maintained an AWS with a poor 
track record on the battlefield over time would have to be expected to realize 
that there was some risk of war crimes being committed, and could then be 
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held accountable. In the UK legal system, liability is determined on the basis of 
the degree of the risk. The US system, conversely, determines liability on the 
basis of consciousness of risk, and it is unclear which of the two should be 
considered lex lata in ICL.290  
 Elsewhere in this thesis I have argued that one of the driving forces 
behind the thrust for autonomy is that AWSs do not require communication 
and control from a headquarter. This is thought to prove beneficial in warfare 
against technologically capable enemies, who presumably could be able of to 
hack remote-controlled drones.291 When special-operations teams operate 
behind enemy lines without communication with their superiors, they can at 
least themselves be held responsible for their acts. AWSs cannot. From the 
viewpoint of ICL, however, it is very questionable whether such tactics, by 
which a machine is left on its own without anyone even monitoring its actions, 
would be lawful. I suggest that it would not, as both IHL and ICL presupposes 
that acts of war are attributable to human beings. By extension, we may reason 
that any tactics that render this impossible are unlawful. 
While an AWS clearly does not have criminal responsibility, either in 
the sense of ‘answerability’ or ‘liability’ of its own,292 the doctrine of command 
responsibility also appears difficult. While it would cover some cases war 
crimes committed by AWSs, large loopholes would remain. Neither of the 
channels of responsibility identified by Schmidt appear watertight. It seems to 
me that only the state would be clearly responsible for the actions of an AWS. 
Individual responsibility both for programmers and commanders would be very 
hard to establish. Given the increasing importance of ICL in international law, 
the question then becomes whether it is lawful to develop a weapon system that 
to a large extent leapfrogs both individual and command responsibility. 
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6 Formulating the Uncanny: Machines with a 
Licence to Kill 
6.1 Extending Responsibility  
The previous chapter left us somewhat unsatisfied. We would have liked to 
have clearer lines of responsibility for the attribution of potential crimes 
committed by AWSs. While AWSs clearly are not human, we perceive them as 
something more than inanimate tools; they have some form of agency of their 
own. As Robert Sparrow notes, ‘[t]o say of an agent that they are autonomous 
is to say that their actions originate in them and reflect their ends.’293 The 
notion of autonomy is tightly knit to the concept of mens rea, being 
subjectively aware of one’s actions. In this context, Sanford Kadish has noted 
that ‘[m]uch of our commitment to democratic values, to human dignity and 
self-determination, to the value of the individual, turns on the pivot of a view 
of man as a responsible agent entitled to be praised or blamed’.294 Allowing 
individual responsibility through ICL to wither, fails to acknowledge the 
function responsibility plays in society, and how important it could be for the 
people left behind to see the perpetrators (or at least those suspected) of war 
crimes tried.295 
Whom or what one might include in a definition of autonomy is clearly 
time-dependent. One might include children, but how old? Are all grown-ups 
autonomous, or is a certain level of consciousness or cognitive capacity 
required, thus excluding people with severe enough mental disabilities? What 
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about animals or machines? Likely, many will have experienced anger at (not 
just with) a computer prone to freezing at just the wrong moment. The Persian 
King Xerxes famously had the sea whipped for destroying the pontoon bridge 
he had had built over the Hellespont in the fifth century BC. A terrible storm 
had torn his bridge asunder, (temporarily) ruining his plans to invade Greece.296 
Almost equally foreign to our contemporary understanding are animal trials, 
which were practiced widely in Europe from the 13th to the 18th century.297 
Evidently, contemporary international law fails to capture an important, 
perhaps the most important, aspect of AWSs, which is the plain objection that 
machines should not be delegated the capability to take moral decisions, such 
as selecting targets in war. With their article ‘The Morality of Autonomous 
Robots’, Aaron M. Johnson and Sidney Axinn are of the few commentators 
who have actually tried to justify the proposition that machines should not be 
allowed to kill people. They suggest that the question of decision-making is 
distinct from the question of responsibility, which, according to them, is ‘really 
a detail’, as AWSs are subject to the same constraints as other weapons and 
machines.298 Johnson and Axinn, then, deny that AWSs have a form of agency 
of their own. They suggest that since ‘all […] values are created by sacrifice or 
the risk of sacrifice’, then ‘[w]here there is no human in the loop, there is no 
one to risk sacrifice, and therefore no honor produced’.299 Moreover, a ‘robot is 
in a way like a high-tech mousetrap; it is not a soldier with concerns about 
human dignity or military honor. Therefore, a human should not be killed by a 
machine’.300 Lastly, ‘[a] nation that relies on such weapons ignores the 
humanitarian basis for the laws of war.’ 301 This justifies a prohibition of 
AWSs, they contend.302  
                                            
296 Herodotus, 6.35. 
297 J.E. Salisbury, 2011, p. 115. 
298 A.M. Johnson and S. Axinn, 2013, p. 132. 
299 A.M. Johnson and S. Axinn, 2013, pp. 135, 136. 
300 A.M. Johnson and S. Axinn, 2013, p. 134. 
301 A.M. Johnson and S. Axinn, 2013, p. 138. 
302 A.M. Johnson and S. Axinn, 2013, p. 138. 
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Evidently, they offer three distinct arguments: (1) production of honour, 
(2) lack of dignity, and (3) humanitarian concerns. As I have treated the 
humanitarian considerations at length elsewhere in this thesis, I shall focus the 
former two arguments. Both of them appear lacking: First, if the production of 
honour (in bello) was the purpose of war, we should go to war as often as 
possible, in order to maximize our opportunities to sacrifice ourselves in the 
pursuit of winning praise; the injunction is prone to the same criticism as the 
slippery slope argument. How ‘all […] values are created by sacrifice’ is, 
moreover, not explained or justified. A sacrifice, surely, is best measured in 
terms of the people the sacrifice is made for, not the one(s) it is made by (which 
is indeed what their focus on humanitarian concerns seem to suggest). As 
Johnson and Axinn do not distinguish between AWSs, toasters, mousetraps, 
and conventional weapons on the issue of responsibility (and thus agency), it is 
unclear why they do so on the matter of sacrifice. By immanent logic, this 
would appear to tie them to the position that all weapons should be prohibited 
on the grounds of their missing the capacity for sacrifice. Why it is better to be 
saved by a sacrificing human (who might die) than a machine, also seems 
unclear to me, or at least worthy of justification.  
A second immanent critique would be that if the proposition that all 
value comes from sacrifice is true, it is difficult to explain the second sub-
argument, that AWSs run counter to human dignity. ‘To give a programmed 
machine the ability to “decide” to kill a human is to abandon the concept of 
human dignity’, they assert.303 Through the authors’ use of the word ‘decide’ 
(which is notably marked with quotation marks), and consequent decoupling of 
the AWS from its users, it appears that machine agency is taken back into the 
fold, which, surely, should have implications for their assessment of 
responsibility and sacrifice. Johnson and Axinn appear to want to have it both 
ways. (I discuss the concept of dignity later on, attempting to justify it in 
intersubjective recognition and moral agency.)  
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Rather than in the capacity for sacrifice, the answer to the question of 
whether machines should be permitted to take human lives should be sought in 
the relationship between humans and between humans and machines. The 
objection against AWSs themselves (not just the harm they might inflict) goes 
beyond the responsibility issue strictly defined. The intermediate moral 
autonomy of AWSs, and the outsourcing of moral decision making their use 
implies, lies at the root of deeper philosophical objections to the development 
and deployment of AWSs. In this chapter I investigate a second main question 
concerning ‘the harmer’, eloquently put by the UN special rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, who delivered 
a report on AWSs in April 2013:  
Even if it is assumed that LARs [AWSs] […] could comply with IHL, 
and it can be proven that on average and in the aggregate they will save 
lives, the question has to be asked whether it is not inherently wrong to 
let autonomous machines decide who and when to kill.304 
Heyns did not himself attempt to answer this question at any length. On a meta-
ethical level, one may note that what Heyns is essentially asking, is whether 
there are deontological or virtue ethical considerations which override the 
underlying utilitarian calculation.  
6.2 Robots, Automata, and Fiction 
By way of introduction, let us first take a brief look at how robots and similar 
agents have been looked at in the past. History – how we have reasoned about 
responsibility and agency in the past – might pinpoint some of the problematic 
issues with which we are concerned. In fiction, particularly science fiction, 
robots have had an important place. However, Star Wars’ R2-D2 and C-3PO 
and the Arnold-character in the Terminator universe are just the culmination of 
millennia-old history of fictional robots or automata. Robot-like entities – 
statues coming to life or creatures being built from natural elements – are 
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known from both ancient Greek, Chinese, and Islamic writings. In Greek 
mythology, Hephaestus, the God of craftsmen, blacksmiths, and sculptors, was 
known to craft living creatures called automata for help in domestic affairs and 
for security. In Homer’s Iliad, reference is made to wheel-born tripods that 
Hephaestus uses for domestic jobs,305 and to golden hand-maidens, which were 
‘endowed with intelligence and had learned their skills from the immortal 
gods.’306  In the Odyssey, the protagonist travels to the court of Alcinous, king 
of the Phaiakians, to find artificial, life-like, watchdogs guarding the palace: 
On either side stood gold and silver dogs, which Hephaestus had made 
with cunning skill, to keep watch over the palace of the great-hearted 
Alcinous and serve him as immortal sentries never doomed to age.307 
Alcinous’ dogs are clear precursors of modern weapon systems. The demand 
for the modern military robots is often said to be driven by the need to cover 
the jobs that are ‘dirty, dangerous, and dull’. The watchdogs in the Odyssey are 
employed to cover the last of the ‘three Ds’: the dull guarding of the door. 
However, an important distinction should be made between Alcinous’ dogs 
and, for instance, modern drones: While the watchdogs serve strictly defensive 
purposes, drones are, by virtue of their speed, manoeuvrability, and stamina, 
inherently offensive weapons. This allows Homer to avoid the question of the 
virtue of employing such robots for offensive purposes. It is fair to suggest that 
such tactics would not be considered all too virtuous in a tradition where 
soldiers went to war to win personal glory and honour (kleos).308 
Thomas Hobbes famously opens his Leviathan with a reference to man’s 
capacity to create an ‘artificial animal’, going on to ask ‘may we not say, that 
all Automata […] have an artificiall life?’309 The fascination with robots is old 
and carries religious undertones. Robots, automata, or androids are humans 
without a ‘soul’ or prospects for an afterlife.  
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The word robot was introduced by the Czech playwright Karel Čapek in 
his1921 R.U.R.: Rossum’s Universal Robots. The play featured human-like 
machines, ‘robota’ (meaning ‘servitude’ or ‘drudgery’ in Czech), which were 
put to hard labour in a dystopian world. ‘Android’ also has a longer history, 
albeit not as long as automaton. According to the Oxford English Dictionary it 
was first used by Ephraim Chambers’ Cyclopedia from 1728 in reference to an 
automaton. ‘Android’ is composed of the Greek words for ‘man’ (anēr) and 
‘form’ (oeidēs), and in the modern usage of the term, an android is an 
anthropomorphic robot, i.e. a robot that looks like a human.310 
The TV series Star Trek, first aired on the US TV channel NBC in 1966, 
features several so-called androids equipped with artificial intelligence, acting 
more or less just like any human being. Other entertainment franchises, such as 
the Star Wars films, 2001: A Space Odyssey, and I, Robot followed, the latter 
two first appearing as book series. In many of these stories, the robots, 
androids, or automata are clearly considered to have a considerable amount of 
free will, responsibility, and even emotions. Although fictitious, such stories 
both create – and are created by – human beings’ ideas and feelings about 
machines.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, automata and their likes 
started to become an issue not only in fiction, but also in academic literature. In 
1906, the German psychiatrist Ernst Jentsch published an essay called ‘On the 
Psychology of the Uncanny’, in which he argues that automata and dolls have 
an unsurpassed aptitude in producing ‘uncanny’ (unheimlich) feelings in 
human beings, due to their compelling nature of begging ‘intellectual 
uncertainty’: The human observer might mistake a doll or automaton for a 
human, producing hesitancy in the observer as to how to treat, and feel about, 
such entities, as they (at least in our perception) assume a sort of intermediate 
position between being dead and alive. Jentsch focuses on E.T.A. Hoffmann’s 
fictional story ‘Der Sandmann’ (The Sandman) in which the protagonist falls in 
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love with a lifelike automaton or doll called Olympia which he only sees 
through a window across the street. The love-stricken young man clearly 
mistakes Olympia for a real woman, and the revelation and following 
emotional bewilderment that she is in fact not, is, according to Jentsch, the 
main contributing source of Hoffmann’s story’s uncanny atmosphere.311 
 13 years following the publication of Jentsch’s essay, Sigmund Freud 
picked up on the same theme. Although Freud disagrees with Jentsch that the 
Olympia-incident is the most uncanny aspect of ‘Der Sandman’, Freud agrees 
that the uncanny (das unheimliche) is really a distortion of the familiar (das 
heimliche).312 This could easily be applied to robots – not least military robots 
with lethal capabilities. Existing drones, although not physically mistakable for 
human beings, do display the ingredients of this mechanism: Although the 
actual drone is obviously made of inanimate materials, and looks nothing like a 
human, there is intentionality behind it. Under the drones, there is no knowing 
whether an operator is peering through the drone’s web camera, or whether the 
drone is flying, and filming, on auto-pilot. Neither is there any knowing 
whether the drone is scanning for suspicious behaviour in preparation of a 
strike, and how it will react to behaviour on the ground. In one sense, the drone 
is just a physical extension of human intentionality, but in another sense it is an 
entity of its own, capable of operating for a long time without any human 
involvement. It seems reasonable to hold that the uncanny feelings surrounding 
military robots will by no means be mitigated by increased automation. 
Concerning AWSs, many are strongly at odds with the apparent lack of 
sentience in the harmer.313 
 2001: A Space Odyssey, a popular movie from 1968 telling the story of 
the artificially intelligent computer ‘HAL’, also spawned academic literature. 
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In a book from 1997, the philosopher Daniel Dennett rightly observed that 
mens rea ‘has no requirement that the agent be capable of feeling guilt or 
remorse or any other emotion; so-called cold-blooded murderers are not in the 
slightest degree exculpate by their flat affective state.’314 According to Dennett, 
the requirement for moral responsibility is ‘higher order intentionality’, 
meaning the capability of framing beliefs about one’s own beliefs.315 While no 
computer software has that ability today, they may get it in the future. In that 
case, Dennett argues, it is difficult to see how machine agency differs from that 
of humans.316 John Sullins goes even further than Dennett, submitting that 
when a robot has ‘autonomous intentions and responsibilities […], then the 
machine is a robust moral agent, possibly approaching or exceeding the moral 
status of human beings.’317 On the one hand, we may on a rational level be 
inclined to agree with the conclusions of Dennett and Sullins, but on the other 
hand, we might still feel that their inanimate nature precludes them from full 
membership in the ‘moral sphere’, which I, following Aristotle, define as the 
social institution in which praise and blame is distributed.318 
6.3 Towards An Intersubjective Theory of Killing 
Although the members of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots have largely 
tried to frame the matter as one of potentially adverse humanitarian 
consequences,319 I suggest that it is the ‘uncanny’ that is the basis the 
opposition to AWSs. As experts on robotics are in disagreement, and AWSs 
are not yet in existence, we simply do not know what the effects of their 
deployment will be. (While for example anti-personnel mines and cluster 
munitions by definition cannot be used in accordance with the principle of 
distinction, no such definitional constraint exists for AWSs.) If they could in 
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fact not be used in a discriminating manner, they would already be considered 
unlawful under international law (see Chapter 4). Notwithstanding this, many 
still feel unrest and even ‘feelings of revulsion’320 at AWSs taking human lives. 
A survey of US public opinion from 2013 found that, while 18 per cent of the 
respondents were undecided, 55 per cent strongly or somewhat opposed the use 
of autonomous weapons.321  
As we saw in Chapter 4, notions of ‘humanity’ are strongly present in 
IHL, particularly through the Martens Clause. While the ‘humanity’ or 
‘inhumanity’ referred to in the Clause in legal terms should not be seen in 
isolation from negative humanitarian consequences, an alternative reading of 
the clause, whereby focus is shifted from actions and consequences to the 
actors themselves, might be necessary to understand the curious case of 
AWSs.322 Perhaps killing by a non-human is in a way inhumane as such? 
Codes of chivalry and honour – essentially virtue ethical ideals – have 
set the course for the distribution of praise and blame in war for centuries.323 
Such virtue ethical ideals are highly relational; they are impossible to see in 
isolation from the context in which they are practiced, and towards whom a 
given act is directed.324 In a 1972 paper, Thomas Nagel asserted that there is a 
certain intersubjective, or interpersonal, dimension to the ethics of war:  
[H]ostility or aggression should be directed at its true object […] It is 
evident that some idea of the relation in which one should stand to other 
people underlies this principle, but the idea is difficult to state. I believe 
it is roughly this: whatever one does to another person intentionally must 
be aimed at him as a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a 
subject.325 
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What does it mean that the harm must be directed at a subject? Nagel himself 
does not say. Accordingly, the following sections is an attempt at giving flesh 
to the bone to the notion that even warfare should be viewed as a relation 
between subjects, and that a form of warfare that distorts such a relation is 
unethical. 
6.4 The Master–Slave Dialectic 
Nagel’s take on aggression displays kinship with the Hegelian conception of 
self-consciousness as developed through a ‘struggle for recognition’.326 Hegel’s 
master–slave dialectic offers a powerful heuristic for our understanding of the 
uncanniness of AWSs.327 Before diving into Hegel’s philosophy, however, it is 
important to note that the master–slave dialectic (and the contemporary theory 
of recognition, which builds on Hegelian philosophy),328 has two sides to it: On 
the one hand, it is an analysis of empirical, actual, patterns of human relations 
in the world. On the other hand, it has powerful normative implications.329 In 
other words, Hegel tries to show how his ethics are rested on the material world 
as well as in idealist thought (the latter being what he is most famous for).  
 According to Hegel, the world is structured around contradictions (both 
in terms of how it unfolds and how we grasp it epistemologically).330 A thing is 
never just something in itself; it assumes objective existence only in relation to 
its negation.331 This also holds true for individual human beings and human 
societies, as they seek recognition of their humanity and existence from 
others;332 as Hegel puts it in the Jena lectures, only when recognized does the 
individual have existence. Humans demand an acknowledgement of their 
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identities as something more than just natural existence; a recognition that they 
are, as it were, not immanently ‘attached to life’.333 As Hegel sees it, however, 
successful mutual recognition, by which both subjects are recognized as 
worthy, self-containing individuals, is not always possible. In fact, individuals 
will typically try to force recognition from the ‘other’. As Hegel puts it in the 
Phenomenology, ‘the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that 
they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle’.334 
Particularly in Hegel’s early writings this mechanism of a struggle for 
recognition is held to count also for collectives such as societies, communities, 
and sub-cultures.335 
In the life-and-death struggle for recognition, two outcomes are 
possible: First, one or both subjects are killed, or second, one of them 
capitulates, thus becoming the other’s slave. ‘Through successfully risking his 
life, the master proves that he transcends the natural world, and his own natural 
existence.’336 In Hegel’s thought, this is a tragedy, as the relation of lordship 
and bondage precludes both the slave from being recognized (which would 
undo the master–slave relation) but also the master from true recognition from 
a peer. Recognition from a slave becomes worthless, as the slave is reduced to 
an object of natural existence.337 Hence, both the master and the slave remain 
unfree, and they both fail in developing their identities and integrity. The 
master is furthermore never safe from being ambushed by the slave, and is 
alienated from the external world through reliance on the slave.338 Thus, in the 
typical Hegelian vein, there occurs a reversal; ‘mastery, as sheer self-
affirmation, turns out to be self-subverting and brings about the opposite of 
what it intended. Mastery ends in failure, a dead end that can only be 
maintained by force.’339  
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Hegel’s dialectic of lordship and bondage has been subject to very 
different interpretations. While Alexandre Kojève interprets all human relations 
to at some level reflecting master and slave relations,340 Robert Williams reads 
the passage as a prudential account of failed recognition:341 ‘The fundamental 
inequality of the substance-accident relationship is institutionalized in the 
intersubjective social shape of domination and submission, lordship and 
bondage’.342 Charles Taylor, to the contrary, interprets the Dialectic as an 
account of a historical period corresponding to the Hobbesian state of nature.343 
Anyway, Hegel’s intersubjective account of the master and slave 
relation provides us with an interesting analogy for the case of AWSs, which 
may enable us to further understand the uncanniness of AWSs. For simplicity, I 
shall in the following discuss a situation in which only one of the parties to the 
conflict employs AWSs.344 
Let us imagine that a conflict between two parties arises. Imagine that 
one of the parties (e.g. ‘South’) is utilizing AWSs and the other is not (e.g. 
‘North’).345 Imagine that through technological superiority and the use of 
AWSs, South defeats North and subverts it. South further demands compliance 
and submission from North. Notwithstanding its technological edge, however, 
South, the master, remains vulnerable to ambush and indiscriminate attacks 
from the subjected North, the slave.  
The argument that the use of AWSs is likely to redistribute harm from 
soldiers to civilians has been made by several contributors in the field,346 and 
was partly dismissed by this author in Chapter 3. Yet while the argument here 
is similar, it is not identical. As part of the broader slippery slope argument, the 
asymmetry-problem was viewed through the lens of consequences; here it is 
viewed independently from consequences, through the lens of agency. There is 
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something in the relation between humans and machines itself that appears 
unsettling. Here lies a key to our understanding of AWSs. 
Through the use of AWSs, South is blocked from the moral sphere and 
intersubjective relations. To South, war has become like an industrial activity. 
There is no emotion, no virtue. Perhaps, though, a sense of shame is forming. 
As Nobel laureate Jody Williams has admitted: ‘When my country wants to 
call it a bloodless battlefield I feel enraged. I feel righteous indignation at the 
twisting words.’347 Both parties fail in recognizing each other because of the 
unbridgeable gap created by technology. 
As in Hegel’s thought, we see the outline of a situation whereby the 
master is alienated from the external world as she refuses to partake in the 
actual fighting, rather outsourcing it to the slave and the machine. Here lies an 
important ambiguity and difference: In Hegel’s Dialectic, the master gains 
supremacy because she does not fear death: This is how she seeks to transcend 
natural existence in order to have his independence, identity, and integrity 
recognized. When using AWSs, however, the opposite is true. The party 
employing AWSs is in essence fleeing the battlefield precisely because it – or 
its political leaders – fear death. Thus, the master in the South–North analogy 
may not be the master at all; an even clearer reversal than in the 
Phenomenology is evident. ‘[i]t is only through staking one’s one life that 
freedom is won.’348 
In Albert Camus’ play The Just Assassins (1949) the issue of risk is 
explored: The protagonists, Kaliayev, purports that even an assassination can 
be justified as long as the assassin exposes him- or herself to risk, and faces up 
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to the consequences after the deed is done.349 More than just physical risk, 
taking a life requires moral responsibility. The CIA’s use of remote-controlled 
drones would be a good example of this. When the United States use drones 
outside of war zones it is not the US military that uses them, but the CIA, 
which is not subject to the same reporting obligations as the military. The use 
of AWSs, however, goes a step further than leapfrogging physical risk (like 
artillery) and responsibility (like CIA-controlled drones): The use of AWSs 
lead to an outsourcing of moral agency to machines. Indeed, we might go as far 
as to say that AWSs are not riskless weapons at all, as such a concept at least to 
a certain extent requires that someone is relieved of risk. In the case of remote-
controlled drones it is obvious who this someone is (the pilot), but in the case 
of AWSs he or she is just an abstract unknown, someone who might have 
performed the same tasks as the AWS in the past. 
The CIA’s (and to a somewhat lesser extent the Pentagon’s) use of 
drones has been the subject of stark opposition from international organizations 
including the UN, the EU, a number of civil society actors, and media,350 using 
phrases such as ‘inherently un-American and cowardly’, and ‘a danger to 
humanity’.351 Much of this criticism has come from within the United States 
and other countries that employ drones, so it is clear that there is a sense of 
embarrassment on one’s own state and people’s behalf. I argue that the use of 
AWSs would take this even further. As Hegel purports in the master–slave 
dialectic, the tragedy is not just that the slave is misrecognized, but also that the 
master is barred from the moral sphere. The same is happening when moral 
agency is outsourced to machines. I argue that the distortion of the master–
slave dialectic evident in the hypothetical use of AWSs contribute strongly to 
the feelings of ‘revulsion’ at automated killing described by some 
commentators. The important point here is that the use of AWSs may not only 
                                            
349 A. Camus, 1958, Act 3. See also the author’s preface and J. Walter, 1989, p. 568.  
350 E.g. P. Alston, 2010; European Parliament Resolution on the Use of Armed Drones, 2014; Reprieve, 
2014; M.A. Shah, 2014; G. Miller, 2014. 
351 A. Iqbal, 2012; G. Monbiot, 2012. 
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be a moral wrong only against the people against whom they are used, but also 
against the people using them (and the people on whose behalf they are used). 
In that process humans, as it were, become machines, and vice versa. 
While machines have commonly been thought of as aids for human beings – 
technologies to facilitate human agency – the use of AWSs turns that 
relationship on its head: Humans would presumably do the facilitating – 
programming, coordinating, washing, fuelling – and machines would be taking 
the moral decisions. In his essay ‘Shooting an Elephant’, George Orwell 
ponders the (Hegelian) mechanism by which actions reflect back upon the actor 
in unexpected ways. Writing about his experiences in Lower Burma, Orwell 
explains his feeling of misrecognizing himself: 
Here was I, the white man with his gun, standing in front of the unarmed 
native crowd – seemingly the leading actor of the piece; but in reality I 
was only an absurd puppet pushed to and fro by the will of those yellow 
faces behind. I perceived in this moment that when the white man turns 
tyrant it is his own freedom that he destroys. He becomes a sort of 
hollow, posing dummy, the conventionalized figure of a sahib.352 
From Orwell’s point of view, it is not always obvious who is the oppressor and 
who is the oppressed.  
6.5 Arendt’s Active Life 
The German–American philosopher Hannah Arendt (influenced by the Hegel’s 
concepts of action and consciousness)353 similarly understands human relations 
as intersubjective. In The Human Condition (1958) Arendt attempts to conceive 
of what it is that makes humans human. According to her, human activities can 
be divided into three: (1) labour, (2) work, and (3) action. What truly 
distinguishes humans from other species is the latter category of ‘agency’. 
While labour comes down to the rudimentary maintenance of physical 
existence, work is the manufacturing of things, the creation of a separate 
                                            
352 G. Orwell, 1981, p. 152. Sahib is Arabic, meaning, as it happens, ‘master’. 
353 A. Speight, 2002. 
 90 
human world.354 Action, however, transcends the instrumental nature of the 
two former categories, as it is ‘an end in itself’.355 Arendt argues that it is a 
mistake to take freedom to be primarily an inner, contemplative or private 
phenomenon, for it is in fact active, worldly and public’.356 Action can only be 
understood as a joint enterprise, as the transcendence of the instrumental 
dimension necessitates a society or community. It is intrinsically linked to what 
it means to be human, and what it means to be free.357  
Already in the mid-twentieth century, however, Arendt saw a grave 
challenge to ethical life in the form of ‘the advent of automation’.358 While 
automation can certainly have its values in industry, assuming roles in labour 
and work, the sphere of action is inherently political, and inherently human, 
and accordingly, should not be left to machines.359 Abandoning the sphere of 
action could on the one hand have negative moral consequences, but more 
importantly – and in line with what we discovered in the last section – would 
also imply the disempowerment and alienation of the humans responsible for 
the withdrawal from the world. In other words, allowing machines to take over 
human agency is to disrespect humanity in its most basic integrity and nature 
as moral and political agents. Put differently, the use of AWSs is a fundamental 
negation of our own nature. This is precisely what the use of AWSs would 
imply; it would constitute a retreat from the moral world, amounting to 
declaring oneself unfit to manage one’s own affairs. It could also, in 
existentialist terms, be labelled cowardly, if decision-making is seen with 
Sartre (as Arendt) as a fundamental aspect of ethical life.360 Again, the 
objection is not to the lack of physical risk, but the lack of moral risk.  
In Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), Arendt’s account of the trial of one of 
the main architects behind the holocaust, she claims that the ‘trouble with 
                                            
354 Arendt is here influenced by Martin Heidegger, who distinguished between the (natural) ‘earth’ and 
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360 J.P. Sartre, 2010, pp. 67, 574; H. Arendt, 1978, p. 180. 
 91 
Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were 
neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and 
terrifyingly normal’.361 According to his own moral compass, Eichmann was 
not guilty of anything; he had fled the sphere of moral decision-making, taking 
refuge in orders and duty. ‘The longer one listened to him [Eichmann], the 
more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with 
an inability to think.’362 This is, according to Arendt, the ‘banality of evil’; it 
arises from a failure to make moral choices, in the sense of withdrawing from, 
or narrowing, the scope of moral action. That was what made the holocaust so 
evil. ‘The sad truth of the matter is that most evil is done by people who never 
made up their minds to be or do either bad or good’.363 
Hannah Arendt identified two types of ‘modern world alienation’, 
‘twofold flight from the earth into the universe and from the world into the 
self’.364 Firstly, humans have tried to extricate themselves from the external 
world through automation, and secondly, they have escaped into themselves, 
isolating themselves from the moral and political world.365 The use of AWSs 
unites this ‘twofold flight’ into a single retreating motion.  
6.6 Recognition and Dignity: Beyond Lordship and Bondage 
According to Hegel, ‘ethical life’ and freedom is represented by three 
institutions: (1) relations of love in within the family, (2) contractual respect in 
the civil society, and (3) notions of solidarity in the state.366 
According to the German social theorist Axel Honneth, all normative 
relations can be traced back to, and modelled as, questions of recognition.367 
Expanding on the philosophy of Hegel and the social psychology of George H. 
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Mead, Honneth launches a moral theory built on an analytic foundation.368 
Honneth subscribes to Hegel’s account of the development of identity and 
ethical life in the three stages, and argues that they have the distinct functions 
of producing self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem.369 Herein lies also 
the basis of disrespect, Honneth postulates: For each positive source of mutual 
recognition and positive relation-to-self – love, contractual or legal respect, and 
solidarity – a corresponding source of misrecognition can be identified: (1) 
physical maltreatment, (2) denial of rights or social ostracism, and (3) 
downgrading of social and moral value.370 As we saw in the section on the 
master–slave dialectic, social relations are reciprocal, meaning that denial of 
recognition to someone else may inhibit our own moral integrity and identity. 
Due to the denial of mutual recognition and retreat from the moral 
sphere it constitutes, the use of AWSs may be said to represent a disrespect of 
the enemy, first, on the level of physical maltreatment, and second, on the level 
of social value and solidarity. Being physically maltreated by an agent with 
whom moral relations are impossible constitutes an ethical challenge beyond 
‘normal’ killing, because of the lack of sentience and possibility of reasoning 
with one’s opponent. The complete withdrawal from the moral sphere pushes 
war in the direction of ‘vermin control’, by which a problem is exterminated 
automatically, asymmetrically, and without feelings. This, I argue, is likely to 
produce an extreme sense of disrespect and humiliation, the root of injustice in 
the theory of recognition.371 
On the level of social value, the use of AWSs may be said to undermine 
the dignity of the party against whom they are used. It may be thought casuistry 
to distinguish whether someone is killed by a machine or by a human – the 
fundamental issue at stake, surely, is the killing – but on the other hand, there is 
a long tradition of honour and dignity as virtues in warfare, probably more so 
in warfare than in domestic law enforcement (see footnote 145). The phrasing 
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of the first sentence in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights powerfully 
captures the essence of the underlying principle, expressing a ‘recognition of 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world’.372  
The issue of recognition spills into the question of responsibility: 
Offering recognition, or at least the possibility of an intersubjective relation, is 
at the same time to be morally responsible. Acts of war are inherently moral 
acts, to which there should be attached clear lines of responsibility. As Michael 
Walzer puts it: ‘There can be no justice in war if there are not, ultimately, 
responsible men and women.’373 
Continuing with the just war tradition, one may furthermore say that that 
the use of AWSs gravely challenges the notion of the moral equality of 
soldiers, a central concern in the modern just war tradition following Michael 
Walzer. According to him, individual soldiers have a moral obligation to act in 
consistence with the law and moral codes on the battlefield (in bello), but are 
exempt from the justness or unjustness of the war as a whole (ad bellum). The 
fundamental distinction in warfare is not between the guilty and the innocent, 
but between combatants and non-combatants. The licence to kill innocents 
(which regular soldiers most often are) is usually theorized as legitimized by 
the mutual imposition of risk,374 but, I argue, this licence also requires ‘moral 
risk’, i.e. responsible agency. 
The laws and morality of war presuppose a reciprocity and moral 
equality between the belligerents. This equality is eroded by riskless warfare. 
The use of armed drones, then, may be said to be immoral. The use of AWSs, 
however, goes beyond this injustice: Withdrawing from the moral sphere 
through the outsourcing of moral decision-making amoralizes war, making the 
question of moral equality irrelevant or inappropriate. According to both the 
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Hegelian theory of recognition and the just war tradition, morality cannot be 
understood other than intersubjectively. The moral equality of soldiers has 
what we might see as a corresponding Article in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which again, seems difficult to square with the use of AWSs 
against humans: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards 
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’375  
If the principles of reciprocity, recognition, and dignity are indeed as 
absolute as theorists like Axel Honneth claim, they should not be put at risk. 
The use of AWSs would be unethical, since such weapons would bar humans 
from the ‘Arendtian’ sphere of action, and would constitute a misrecognition of 
the physical integrity and social worth not only of the enemy, but also of the 
people using them, and the people on whose behalf they are applied.   
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7 Conclusion 
The questions pertaining to whether AWSs would adhere to the rules for the 
conduct of hostilities on the one hand, and the supposed consequences of their 
deployment on the other, are qualitatively different from the question of 
whether machines ought to be granted the capability to take life-or-death 
decisions. In this thesis, I have tried to separate these questions.  
While the former two questions belong within a consequentialist 
universe (as they implicitly answer the latter question affirmatively), the latter 
belong to the world of duties and virtue. While the former questions are 
susceptible to changes in the external world, most importantly the 
technological development of artificial intelligence, the answer to the latter 
question cannot be resolved by anything in the empirical world. While the 
former questions can be, and are, opposed on factual grounds, the latter 
question begs a more definite answer.  
 In the chapter on the slippery slope – the notion that allowing the use of 
AWSs will lead to a host of unintended, negative consequences such as a lower 
threshold to resort to the use of force in international affairs – I noted that there 
are crippling objections against most of these arguments. First, the argument 
that AWSs increases the inclination to use force has difficulties distinguishing 
between AWSs and other so-called riskless weapons, or indeed other 
technologies such as armour, camouflage, and medicine, which are all intended 
to protect soldiers. Perhaps the use of both AWSs and medicine in war is 
morally wrong, but it seems to me that a theory addressing this would be an 
ideal one for an ideal universe.376 Second, while the argument that AWSs may 
redistribute harm from soldiers to civilians could be valid, hypotheticals 
seldom do enough to justify the prohibition of a weapon deemed to have 
military utility.  
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 In the chapter on the conduct of hostilities, I noted that given the 
definition of AWSs as ‘weapons that can independently select and attack 
targets’, the important question is not whether such systems would be 
inherently indiscriminate (by definition, they would be, as only military 
objectives and soldiers may be defined as ‘targets’377), but whether it is 
possible to develop such machines at all. 
I noted that current technology is far away from such a prospect. The 
norm of distinction requires that parties ‘shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives.’378 In the context of AWSs, a robot or software 
would be the one ‘directing’. As targeting is a fundamentally strategic act, 
AWSs would to some extent be granted power over the dynamic and 
development of the war itself. Particularly the norm of proportionality appears 
very difficult, considering that the system itself would have to be able to 
balance fluctuating interests and unintended civilian casualties. Nevertheless, 
the argument is an empirical one, and improved technology would obligate its 
subscriber to allow for their use. While for example anti-personnel landmines 
are discriminate by definition, AWSs are not.  
 In the chapter on responsibility I shifted focus from the consequences of 
the use of AWSs – the harm they might inflict – to the objections against the 
weapon systems themselves: ‘the harmer’. Here, I contended that AWSs to a 
considerable degree pulverize individual responsibility under IHL/ICL. Indeed, 
it is possible to imagine a situation whereby an AWS by all intents and 
purposes ‘intentionally’ commits a war crime without any one person 
responsible. The software an AWS requires would be so complex that it would 
be physically impossible for an individual to read all the lines of coding.379 On 
the other hand, individual responsibility is not a vital part of international law. 
State responsibility, which AWSs do not appear to challenge, would still apply. 
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 In the last chapter, I looked at the objection against giving AWSs a 
‘licence to kill’, the argument that it is inherently wrong to allow machines to 
kill people. I claimed that such an argument ought not to be decoupled from the 
question of responsibility, nor justified with AWSs’ lack of a capacity for 
sacrifice.380 Rather, a prohibition of AWSs should be justified in the retreat 
from the moral sphere that their use implies. The use of AWSs would arguably 
be a moral wrong not just against the people they are used, but also against 
their employers. It would contradict and misrecognize their status as moral 
agents, and alienate them from the moral significance of the war. The 
application of AWSs would imply an outsourcing of ‘agency’, according to 
Arendt the defining aspect of humanity, consequently running the risk of the 
‘banality of evil’. Their use would furthermore impair the moral equality of 
soldiers, and the dignity of both the user and the victim. I suggested that the 
intermediate status of AWSs between being dead and alive, and the distortions 
of intersubjectivity referred to above, produce the uncanny feeling that I 
believe is the major driving force behind the mounting opposition to AWSs. 
Hence, I suggested that the last of the arguments is the strongest one in the 
quest for a prohibition of AWSs. 
 Whether ‘the harmer’ can be decoupled from ‘the harm’ he or she 
causes is the primary question that states and their leaders must ponder as the 
grounds for a ban on AWSs are discussed. I would suggest that while IHL does 
not necessarily fail to regulate AWSs, it might still be insufficient in capturing 
the central challenge posed by machines with a licence to kill. This is the 
fundamental question both individuals and states must ask themselves, lest 
warfare might be changed irreversibly for the worse. AWSs raise urgent 
questions about moral agency that the international community must address. 
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